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1 INTRODUCTION 
The present research project, carried out during a period of three years, has been 
especially focused on R&D issues related to innovative components and/or systems aimed 
at enhancing the safety features of nuclear reactor designs. Several reactor years’ 
experience has been gained in operating hundreds of nuclear reactors since the 50s, but 
in the latest designs very important improvements have been introduced. Among these 
designs, some are especially focused on the intensive use of redundancy and physical 
separation of the safety related systems, others characterized by an intensive use of 
inherently safe or passive safety systems, prevent by design accidental conditions 
occurrence. Since the former possibility does not lead to the introduction of innovative 
systems or components, but only in a very limited level, the study and the development of 
safety systems, to be applied to nuclear reactors, have been mainly focused on systems 
characterized by an intensive use of passive devices that could foresee the use of 
innovative solutions. 
The activation and operation of passive safety systems are generally characterized by 
limited driving forces (e.g. temperature difference, density gradient, pressure drop, etc.). 
As a consequence, the design of passive systems is more sensitive to the system 
parameters. An active system requires a simpler design since the presence of any unlikely 
force, opposed to the driving force, can be easily overcome by the higher intensity of the 
driving force itself. Concerning the passive systems, the design is much more complicated 
since the driving force, which allows the system to be activated and/or to operate, has a 
limited intensity, comparable with other natural forces present into the system itself (e.g. 
the pressure drop against the circulation pump head). The design of a passive system 
requires an optimization of the geometry and an accurate evaluation of the timing to be 
sure that the system complies with the needed safety requirements. 
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An active system can be used after having tested all the constituting components (e.g. 
pumps, valves, etc.) while a passive system has to be tested in a full-scale facility to be 
sure that the system performances comply with the requirements. Likewise, a valve 
shutter, the position of which is controlled by an electric actuated device (to open/close), 
can be considered almost unaffectable by fouling issues due to the high intensity force 
applicable to move the shutter. A passive valve has to overcome this problem by design 
since the applicable forces are of smaller intensity. 
The main effort, that has been done in the present research work, has been mainly 
focused on the identification of design solutions able to improve the plant safety features. 
Studies have been mainly focused on passive safety systems characterized by special 
features that allow it to limit the possible initiating failure events that would make the 
system unavailable when requested. Better solutions are usually characterized by very 
simplified systems (number of components as low as possible) coupled with very robust 
designs in which the main purpose is the minimization of the forces that could 
counterbalance the main driving force. 
The systems developed during these three years have safety features comparable with 
those of latest plant designs; in some cases, the safety features of the developed systems 
results to be even better. In particular, the present research work has been finalized to the 
development of special solutions optimized to guarantee the safety performance removing 
the decay heat from the primary coolant of nuclear reactors. As clearly visible below, the 
developed systems are especially optimized to be used on small sized nuclear reactors, 
where the required heat transfer surfaces are smaller, but an application on larger sized 
reactors could be also possible slightly reviewing the system design. 
The research work has been initially focused on the analysis of existing nuclear reactors 
designs1 in order to identify the most promising solutions and the possible areas of action 
to propose innovative solutions to apply. In this field, the most important issue, which has 
been identified to propose new solutions, is related to the heat removal function that must 
guarantee the decay heat removal, after the shutdown, also in emergency condition. 
Nuclear cores, after the shutdown, continues to produce thermal power (in different 
measure depending on the type) that in normal operating condition is removed by an 
                                            
1 The first step of the research work has been mainly focused on PWRs since they are the most widespread 
technology used to produce energy and hence characterized by the higher reactor experience. 
Introduction 
3 
 
active2 system. In the unlikely condition in which electric power source of the active heat 
removal system is not available, backup systems have to be activated to guarantee this 
same function3. A very innovative solution, especially suitable for SMRs, has been 
developed and studied for a never ending heat sink. 
Moreover, the growing interest in nuclear reactors during the last few years (nevertheless, 
affected by the Fukushima accident), led to study possible solutions to apply on fast 
nuclear reactors, in order to increase their safety features. The reactors here considered 
belong to the IV Generation of nuclear reactors, characterized by very strong safety 
requirements. In the present research work, an innovative system, originally studied for 
SFRs, allows to remove the decay heat from the primary coolant minimizing, thanks to a 
double wall barrier, the possibility of primary and secondary coolants interaction 
(especially concerning sodium-water reaction issues). The special features characterizing 
the system made it also suitable for application on LFRs. The different features of sodium 
and lead as coolants have been deeply analyzed to carry out a performance assessment 
of the DHX that is the key component of the innovative decay heat removal system 
studied. 
The present study shows how, the proposed approach concerning the safety issues of 
nuclear reactors, thanks to the accidental condition prevention considered from the design 
stage, would make it possible to avoid or to minimize the occurrence of accidental 
conditions. The philosophy that has been followed in the present work is that of the "safety 
by design"; criterion according to which the extreme simplification of the systems together 
with the use of natural laws to guarantee the safety functions make the whole system 
cheaper and safer. Obviously it is true only if the design has been optimized to prevent any 
unlikely forces combination that would make the system unable to comply with the safety 
requirements. 
Here below, a resume of some activities carried out during this research period are 
reported. 
 
                                            
2 With the term “active” is intended a system that requires a source of power to start and to operate. 
3 The backup systems can be both active and passive, depending on the whole plant design. In any case, 
the redundancy and physical separation criteria are applied. 
Nuclear Reactors Safety Aspects 
4 
 
2 NUCLEAR REACTORS SAFETY ASPECTS 
Nuclear power plants have been always characterized by the highest industrial levels of 
safety, becoming, with time, more and more stringent. The different targets imposed to 
nuclear reactor plant designs to be licensed make it possible to classify nuclear reactors 
under different generations, starting from the first generation of prototypes of the 50s and 
60s up to the Generation IV nuclear reactors that will be built in the coming decades. 
 
2.1 Nuclear reactors’ generations 
Nuclear power plants have evolved over time exploiting the experience gained on the 
operation of existing plants. Unlike other technologies, nuclear reactors designs have 
never been based on the “trial and error” process but on many dedicated studies and 
experimental campaigns. In any case, nuclear reactor plants have evolved as distinct 
design generations, taking into account all the problems found in the operation of previous 
reactors. The different generations are the following: 
 
 First generation: prototypes, and first realizations (~1950-1970) 
 Second generation: current operating plants (~1970-2030) 
 Third generation: deployable improvements to current reactors (~2000 and on). 
 Fourth generation: advanced and new reactor systems ( 2030 and beyond) 
 
Most of the operating nuclear power plants were built between the 70s and the 90s and 
belong to the second generation of nuclear reactor designs. 
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Figure 1. Chronological development of nuclear reactors’ generations 
 
To reach a widespread diffusion of nuclear reactors, future plants have to be designed with 
very enhanced safety and economic features. In particular, the Generation IV International 
Forum (GIF) defined some targets that Generation IV nuclear reactors have to comply with 
[1]: 
 
Sustainability-1: Generation IV nuclear energy systems will provide sustainable energy 
generation that meets clean air objectives and provides long-term availability of systems 
and effective fuel utilization for worldwide energy production. 
Sustainability-2: Generation IV nuclear energy systems will minimize and manage their 
nuclear waste and notably reduce the long-term stewardship burden, thereby improving 
protection for the public health and the environment. 
Economics-1: Generation IV nuclear energy systems will have a clear life-cycle cost 
advantage over other energy sources. 
Economics-2: Generation IV nuclear energy systems will have a level of financial risk 
comparable to other energy projects. 
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Safety and Reliability-1: Generation IV nuclear energy systems operations will excel in 
safety and reliability. 
Safety and Reliability-2: Generation IV nuclear systems will have a very low likelihood 
and degree of reactor core damage. 
Safety and Reliability-3: Generation IV nuclear energy systems will eliminate the need for 
offsite emergency response. 
Proliferation resistance and Physical Protection: Generation IV nuclear energy 
systems will increase the assurance that they are very unattractive and the least desirable 
route for diversion or theft of weapons-usable materials, and provide increased physical 
protection against acts of terrorism. 
 
2.2 Nuclear reactors’ safety requirements 
The abovementioned targets are very stringent and they are required for the GEN IV 
nuclear reactors. Even if the previous generations of nuclear reactors have not these 
requirements, three main safety function requirements have been always present. These 
safety functions are: 
 The Chain Reaction stop (Core Shutdown); 
 The Decay Heat Removal; 
 The Containment Integrity. 
 
2.2.1 The Core Shutdown 
The core shutdown function must be available in every reactor conditions since it 
guarantees the stop of the chain reaction. This requirement can be met by means of 
different systems but it implies specific requirements on the reactor design. The most 
commonly used method to obtain the reactor shutdown is the control rods’ insertion, 
among or within the fuel assemblies. To guarantee, in every operative and accidental 
condition, the control rods insertion, the fuel assemblies must preserve their geometry; on 
the contrary, the control rod insertion would not be possible and thus the stop of the chain 
reaction. For this reason, in addition to the requirement of  a robust core mechanical 
design, some backup solutions and criteria are foreseen to stop the reaction. First, the 
reactor shutdown must be guaranteed complying with the “single failure” criterion that 
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means that the reactor shutdown is guaranteed even if a control element would remain 
outside the core. As backup solutions, referring to LWRs, additional water inventories with 
high concentration of soluble boron are foreseen; they are directly connected to the reactor 
vessel allowing to stop the chain reaction in case of failure of the control rods system. 
 
2.2.2 The Decay Heat Removal 
The Decay Heat Removal function has to be guaranteed since after the reactor shutdown, 
due to decay reactions of radioactive isotopes, the reactor core continues to produce 
thermal heat. At the time of the shutdown, the heat produced in the core is about 7% of the 
power before shutdown  and then it decrease following an exponential decreasing trend. 
In the LWR cores, in order to evaluate the decay heat produced after a t0 period from the 
shutdown, the following correlations4 are usually adopted: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0
0
P t
ANS t ANS t t
P
= − +   (2.1) 
where: 
P(t)  is the decay heat power [ W ]; 
P0  is the design thermal power of the reactor [ W ]; 
t  is the elapsed time from the reactor shutdown [ s ]; 
t0 is the equivalent full power time of the reactor core [ s ]; 
and the ANS dimensionless parameter has to be evaluated by the following set of 
empirical correlations: 
 0.0639
0.0603 5 10ANS for s t s
t
= < ≤   (2.2) 
 0.181
0.0766 10 150ANS for s t s
t
= < ≤   (2.3) 
 60.283
0.130 150 4 10ANS for s t s
t
= < ≤ ⋅   (2.4) 
 60.335
0.266 4 10ANS for t s
t
= > ⋅   (2.5) 
                                            
4 This set of equation has been defined by the ANS, neglecting the contribution of 239U and 239Np to the total 
produced power. 
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Usually, for the firsts five seconds, the decay heat is assumed to be equal to the core 
power before shutdown (in safety analyses, reference is made generally to the core rated 
power). More recent studies focused on FRs have defined the core decay heat power by 
means of the following correlations [2]: 
 
 
( ) 0.3239
0
0.2146 300
P t
t for t s
P
−= ⋅ ≤   (2.6) 
 
( ) 0.256
0
0.1439 300
P t
t for t s
P
−= ⋅ >   (2.7) 
where: 
P(t) is the decay heat power [ W ]; 
P0 is the design thermal power of the reactor [ W ]; 
t is the elapsed time from the reactor shutdown [ s ]. 
 
The decay heat removal is one of the most important functions to absolve since the heat 
transfer mechanism takes place under the condition of imposed power. Under this 
condition, if the normal cooling system is not able to remove all the produced heat, the fuel 
temperature, as well as the cladding temperature, would rise up: the heat transfer 
capability of the safety decay heat removal system shall allow the guarantee  heat removal 
at fuel and cladding temperatures compatible with the integrity of the core, with coolant 
medium in a thermodynamic state compatible with a reliable heat removal function. 
 
 ( )core coolantP U S T T= ⋅ ⋅ −   (2.8) 
 
where: 
P is the decay heat power to be removed5 [ W ]; 
U is the local heat transfer coefficient between the fuel and the coolant 
[ W m-2 K-1 ]; 
S is the reference heat transfer surface [ m2 ]; 
                                            
5 It is defined by the elapsed time from the shutdown and by the time that the fuel elements had spent within 
the core. 
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Tcore is the local fuel temperature [ K ]; 
Tcoolant is the local reference temperature of the coolant [ K ]; 
 
If the fuel temperature (Tcore) locally becomes higher than the fuel melting point over the 
full diameter of the fuel pellet, a severe accident with core melt would occur. To prevent 
any unlikely accidental condition that can lead the core to greatly increase its temperature, 
the availability and the reliability of the decay heat removal system are safety issues of 
primary prominence. 
When a reactor shutdown occurs, in normal plant condition the decay heat is removed by 
the secondary coolant, of by the normal Residual Heat Removal System, an active system 
that requires a powered component to operate (e.g. circulating pumps are needed). Since 
the decay heat removal function is one of the most important safety related issues, it is 
necessary to foresee backup systems (i.e. the DHRSs), able to operate in case of the first 
system failure. 
The most recent reactor designs are characterized by an extensive use of passive 
systems [3], especially related to safety functions, as the DHRS. Passive systems allow 
reducing the number of components and systems required and increasing hence the 
system availability. Moreover, systems that do not require any external intervention to 
operate are especially suitable to comply with the safety requirements. 
A large part of the present work has been focused on the research and development of 
safety heat removal systems and components, especially passive, able to remove, for an 
unlimited period of time, the thermal heat produced by the core in any accidental condition. 
 
2.2.3 The containment integrity 
The last safety function that has always to be guaranteed is the containment integrity. In 
the unlikely event of any accidental release of radioactivity from the reactor vessel, the 
containment has to assure that the external environment will not be affected by the 
accident with radioactive releases overcoming specified allowable limits. 
If one of the two previous functions fails (or also in accidents releasing the primary coolant, 
always radioactive, into the containment, even without a core melt), the containment 
integrity would protect the surrounding environment from excessive radioactive release. 
The NPP protection systems act from the core (shutdown) to the environment 
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(containment) passing through the heat removal that brings the system to a controlled 
condition. 
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3 NEED FOR PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS 
3.1 Passive system classification 
According to the IAEA definition [3], the passive systems are defined as follows: 
 
For components and systems (but not structures) having safety 
functions, there must be at least two states corresponding to the 
normal function and to the safety function. Then, to change from 
the normal to the safety state: 
 
- there must be "intelligence" such as a signal or 
parametric change to initiate action; 
- there must be power and potential difference or motive 
force to change states; and 
- there must be the means to continue to operate in the 
second state. 
 
A component or system can be called passive when all three of 
these considerations are satisfied in a self-contained manner. 
Conversely, it is considered active if external inputs are needed. 
 
Since the passive systems can have different characteristics, the IAEA TECDOC-626 
foresees a subdivision in four different classes described here below (excerpt from 
literature [3]): 
 
Category A 
 
This category is characterized by: 
 
- no signal inputs of "intelligence", no external power 
sources or forces, 
- no moving mechanical parts, 
- no moving working fluid. 
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(The no-motion requirement does not extend to unavoidable 
changes in geometry such as thermal expansion.) 
 
Examples of safety features included in this category are: 
- physical barriers against the release of fission 
products, such as nuclear fuel cladding and pressure 
boundary systems; 
- hardened building structures for the protection of a 
plant against seismic and or other external events; 
- core cooling systems relying only on heat radiation 
and/or conduction from nuclear fuel to outer structural 
parts, with the reactor in hot shutdown; and 
- static components of safety related passive systems 
(e.g., tubes, pressurizers, accumulators, surge tanks), 
as well as structural parts (e.g., supports, shields). 
 
Category B 
 
This category is characterized by: 
 
- no signal inputs of "intelligence", no external power 
sources or forces, 
- no moving mechanical parts, but 
- moving working fluids. 
 
The fluid movement is only due to thermal-hydraulic conditions 
occurring when the safety function is activated. No distinction is 
made among fluids of different nature (e.g., borated water and 
air) although the nature of the moving fluid may be significant 
for the availability of the function performed within this 
category. 
 
Examples of safety features included in this category are: 
- reactor shutdown/emergency cooling systems based on 
injection of borated water produced by the disturbance of 
a hydrostatic equilibrium between the pressure boundary 
and an external water pool; 
- reactor emergency cooling systems based on air or water 
natural circulation in heat exchangers immersed in water 
pools (inside containment) to which the decay heat is 
directly transferred; 
- containment cooling systems based on natural circulation 
of air flowing around the containment walls, with intake 
and exhaust through a stack or in tubes covering the 
inner walls of silos of underground reactors; and 
- fluidic gates between process systems, such as "surge 
lines" of PWRs. 
 
Category C 
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This category is characterized by: 
 
- no signal inputs of "intelligence", no external power 
sources or forces; but 
- moving mechanical parts, whether or not moving working 
fluids are also present. 
 
The fluid motion is characterized as in category B; mechanical 
movements are due to imbalances within the system (e.g., static 
pressure in check and relief valves, hydrostatic pressure in 
accumulators) and forces directly exerted by the process. Examples 
of safety features included in this category are: 
 
- emergency injection systems consisting of accumulators or 
storage tanks and discharge lines equipped with check 
valves; 
- overpressure protection and/or emergency cooling devices 
of pressure boundary systems based on fluid release 
through relief valves ; 
- filtered venting systems of containments activated by 
rupture disks; and 
- mechanical actuators, such as check valves and spring-
loaded relief valves, as well as some trip mechanisms 
(e.g., temperature, pressure and level actuators). 
 
Category D 
 
This category addresses the intermediary zone between active 
and passive where the execution of the safety function is made 
through passive methods as described in the previous categories 
except that internal intelligence is not available to initiate the 
process. In these cases an external signal is permitted to trigger 
the passive process. To recognize this departure, this category is 
referred to as "passive execution/active initiation". 
 
Since some desirable characteristics usually associated with 
passive systems (such as freedom from external sources of supply 
and from required human actuation) are still to be ensured, 
additional criteria such as the following are generally imposed on 
the initiation process: 
 
- Energy must only be obtained from stored sources such as 
batteries or compressed or elevated fluids, excluding 
continuously generated power such as normal AC power from 
continuously rotating or reciprocating machinery; 
- Active components are limited to controls, 
instrumentation and valves, but valves used to initiate 
safety system operation must be single-action relying on 
stored energy; and 
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- manual initiation is excluded. 
 
Example of safety systems which may be included in this 
category are: 
- emergency core cooling/injection systems, based on 
gravity driven or compressed nitrogen driven fluid 
circulation, initiated by fail-safe logic actuating 
battery-powered electric or electro-pneumatic valves; 
- emergency core cooling systems, based on gravity-driven 
flow of water, activated by valves which break open on 
demand (if a suitable qualification process of the 
actuators can be identified); and 
- emergency reactor shutdown systems based on gravity 
driven, or static 
 
3.2 Paper on Passive Safety Systems for SMRs 
Conference: Proceedings of the XXIX UIT –Heat Transfer Conference 
Date: June 20-22, 2012 
Title: Analysis of Passive Safety Systems in a Small/Medium Size Nuclear 
Reactor 
Authors: D. Vitale Di Maio, F. Giannetti, A. Naviglio, L. Gramiccia, L. Ferroni 
 
Abstract 
The possibility of having a worldwide spread of nuclear energy, in next years, will be strongly 
affected by safety and management features of the new reactors. Projects in which passive 
systems are intensively used can guarantee the plant management without any external 
intervention in any plant condition. 
Beyond the traditional large sized nuclear reactors, can be possible a development of a parallel 
market, characterized by small/medium sized nuclear reactors which, thanks to their special 
features, allow developing special safety systems. The choice prefer a small/medium sized 
nuclear reactor to a traditional size may be due to several factors including the possibility to use 
special safety systems developed ad hoc or the need of a small capital for the initial investment.  
Specifically will be analysed safety systems related with the decay heat removal, and passive 
systems which, in a different way, can guarantee the safety of the entire system. 
Several safety systems, some already developed for the MARS reactor while others derived 
from existing solutions will be critically analysed to identify what benefits can be effectively 
achieved, in terms of safety and economy. 
 
Main nuclear reactors safety features 
Nowadays there are a lot of different technologies of nuclear reactors, in this study the 
attention is especially focused on nuclear reactors cooled by water and, among them, on 
the PWR technology. All water cooled nuclear reactor technologies have in common some 
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safety functions that must guarantee their functionality in each plant condition. In 
particularly, the three main safety functions of nuclear reactors are: 
 Fission products containment; 
 Reactor shutdown; 
 Decay heat removal. 
Each safety feature will be shortly developed below, before discussing possible solutions 
applicable to small medium sized nuclear reactor rather than to large sized ones. 
In order to simplify the paper comprehension each safety features will be analysed with 
reference to standard solutions used in GEN II PWRs, solutions adopted in newest PWR 
of GEN III and solutions used in the MARS6 reactor design. Moreover, some studies on a 
small solution of the MARS reactor, mini-MARS, have been carrying out, during which 
some alternative safety features are developed and will be discussed below. 
Fission products containment 
The containment of fission products is accomplished by the multi-barriers strategy; several 
elements in series are foreseen between the fuel and the environment. First of all, and 
common to all designs, the barriers are the ceramic composition of the fuel pellets, the fuel 
pin cladding and the pressure boundary of the primary circuit. Moreover, the reactor 
containment building is the last barrier before the environment. 
Concerning on the reactor building, some differences can be identified among different 
reactor designs, even if, according to the GDC167, reactor containments must be designed 
with some specific features. The reactor containment shall be provided to guarantee a 
leak-tight barrier against uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment. Beyond 
the issues concerning the features, the functions can be reached with different designs.  
Usually, a solution with large steel or concrete containment building, composed by one or 
more layers, is adopted; since the large size of the reactor vessel and auxiliary systems do 
not allow any alternative solutions. Concerning the Small and Medium size Reactors 
(SMR), many solutions can be applied to guarantee the fourth barrier from the leak of 
fission products. 
                                            
6 The MARS is a small size pressurized water reactor (PWR) with enhanced safety features. The MARS 
design was developed at the University of Rome "La Sapienza" and it shows many features that would have 
been taken from modern designs. 
7 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria 16 
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The newest nuclear reactors of large size, as the EPR and the AP1000, foresee a two 
layers containment even if with significant differences. The EPR has an inner containment 
(Reactor Building), made up of post tensioned concrete with a steel liner to ensure the 
tightness and an outer containment (Shield Building), made up of reinforced concrete to 
ensure protection to the reactor building from external events. The AP1000 is 
characterized by a double layer containment even if the outer one does not have tightness 
features. The whole system is composed by the containment building, made up of steel in 
order to have a sealed volume, and the shield building, made up of concrete and with 
special design features, to ensure the containment cooling only by natural circulation of an 
air flow, but with direct connections to the environment. The difference between the two 
projects is that the EPR design has a double containment with both mechanical and 
tightness features, the AP1000 design has only a double mechanical containment but a 
single tightness layer. 
A SMR allows foreseeing different solutions to have a double containment, both 
mechanical and physical, as in the MARS design solution: a double layer reactor pressure 
vessel rather than a double containment building. In the MARS design solution, outside the 
reactor pressure vessel (RPV), there is a secondary vessel creating an annulus around the 
RPV (see Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1. Double pressure vessel of the MARS reactor 
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This solution allows to have only a one layer containment building, since the design is 
provided by two pressure vessels, and the possibility to have economic advantages, 
depending on the RPV and containment sizes. Also safety features of project would result 
enhanced, according to the defence in depth strategy, since with a double pressure 
vessels the LOCAs can be considered almost impossible. The RPV operates almost 
without any pressure difference between the two wall sides, hence without any mechanical 
stresses due to inner pressure. The annular volume between the two vessels is 
maintained fill of pressurized cold water and only the outer pressure vessel is subjected to 
a pressure gradient. To maintain a low temperature water inside of the annulus, it is 
required a heat removal system during normal operating condition to compensate the heat 
losses from the RPV; the thermal losses are, in any case, limited by an insulating layer 
provided within the RPV. The presence of a dedicated heat removal system allows, thanks 
to special design solutions, to use the same heat exchanger to remove heat from the RPV 
during severe accident condition. Further studies are carried out on the possibility to apply 
the double vessel solution to a smaller reactor with lower thermal power than the MARS 
also because it is characterized by an integrated primary design: the core, the steam 
generators and the primary pumps are located within the RPV. It is noticed that, in a single 
unit plant, a reduction in the reactor size would mean an increase of the kWh cost. Things 
change when the reference power plant is equipped by several SMRs; since many 
systems can be used in common, by more than one nuclear reactor, the kWh cost would 
reduce, since the smaller size of the SMRs means the possibility to build systems or 
structures outside the plant. Moreover, special features can be developed and used to 
obtain enhanced safety passive systems, whose operation is based on natural laws. 
Reactor Shutdown 
In PWR design the First Shutdown System (FSS) is provided by the fast insertion of some 
clusters of absorber rods while, as backup solution, the Second Shutdown System (SSS) 
is made up by an independent system that should also be physically different. The 
traditional Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) will not be analysed but only some 
innovative solutions will be take into account. Usually, as SSS is used water with a high 
boron concentration able to shutdown the fission reaction.  
SMRs, in this case the focus is on PWRs, have smaller core size and could not be 
necessary using soluble chemical neutron absorber in the reactor coolant (boric acid), 
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during normal operating condition, to flat the flux profile and/or compensate fuel 
consumption, rising in fission products production and burnable absorber depletion. SMRs 
can have the FSS with further systems/components to guarantee the reactor shutdown 
and also SSS based on different physical phenomena. In any case some systems or 
components, developed for SMRs, can be applied to larger reactor, since SMR usually 
have enhanced safety features compared with large size nuclear reactors.  
During this study, several SMR designs were analysed and some interesting solutions 
were identified. Some examples will be shown below: the PSRD, a small size nuclear 
reactor conceptually developed by Japan, has a special latch system on the extension of 
the control rod shaft. The latch system, placed into the primary coolant above the core 
outlet, consists of a permanent magnet and a control magnet with the magnetic saturation 
flux characteristic, function of temperature. When, due to abnormal conditions, the primary 
coolant temperature raises the latch mechanism increases its temperature causing a 
reduction of the magnetic force and the absorber rods fall, automatically thanks to gravity 
force, into the core stopping the fission reaction.  
Another system to assure redundancy in the reactivity control is optionally provided to the 
MARS reactor. Some absorber rods, dedicated only to shutdown, are maintained outside 
the core thanks to a special mechanical system based on differential thermal expansion of 
different metallic materials. An increasing in the primary coolant temperature causes a 
thermal expansion of mechanical structure and system in contact with the fluid. Choosing 
the right materials, depending on the specific operating conditions and on the foreseeable 
transients, the special mechanism developed allows control rods falling, only thanks to 
natural laws, within the core stopping the fission reaction (see Fig. 2). 
Since the two systems just analysed are applicable also to traditional nuclear reactors, the 
attention is now shifted to systems applicable only, or preferably, to SMRs. In this case 
also some flashes on possible fast SMRs reactivity control systems are provided. 
Is important to be noticed that, usually, SMRs have a once through core cycle since their 
cores, composed by a very limited number of fuel assemblies, have a small diameter. The 
absorber rod, especially in small fast nuclear reactors8, can be completely provided 
outside the core region. A fast reactor has two important features that make it especially 
interesting for this kind of solution rather than thermal reactors: 
                                            
8 In fast reactor this solution can be easily applied since the reactivity control can be strongly based on 
neutrons leaks because of the mean free path of fast neutron compared with thermal one. 
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 Higher neutrons mean free path; 
 Higher core power density (small diameter with the same power). 
A special simplified system constitute of some rotatable elements made up of a half 
volume of reflector and the other half volume of absorber materials (see Fig. 3). This 
solution allows to have not any mechanical element above the core, guaranteeing more 
reliable actuating systems and shorter refuelling periods. After the reactor startup, when 
there is the higher reactivity excess, the half absorber volume of the control elements is 
rotated towards the core; when the design burnup is almost reached the half absorber 
volume of the control elements is rotated toward the outside while the reflector volume is 
directed toward the core. 
 
Fig. 2. MARS passive safety mechanism for shutdown backup solution  
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Fig. 3. Core with external rotatable control rods 
 
The SMR design is generally characterized by an integrated structure of the primary 
system, a smaller core compared with traditional size PWR, lower pressure, absence of 
soluble boron in normal condition, higher primary coolant inventory and lower secondary 
coolant inventory. These features allow to use, as backup shutdown system, small volume 
water tanks with high boron9 concentration; the scheme below (see Fig. 4) shows an 
active system, but also a similar system with passive features could be obtained. The main 
components/features of the system are: 
 One tank with a very high boron concentration in water, up to 40000 ppm. To avoid 
the possibility to have boron deposit, the tank is heated, eventually pressurized, and 
mixed continuously; 
 A pump to guarantee the boron injection; 
 Since the whole operating time of the pump, required to obtain the complete 
injection of the boric acid and reach a stable subcritical condition, is shorter than 2 
minutes, the pump can be powered by a dedicated batteries system. 
In case of an accident in which the boron injection system is required, the pump between 
the boron tank and the RPV, automatically actuate the reactor shutdown. The boron 
injection system is designed as a high pressure system since, if necessary, the boron 
injection has to be carried out in a short time and wait for the primary depressurization is 
not possible.  
                                            
9 Boron enriched in boron 10 isotopes. 
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Concerning a hypothetical system configuration for the mini-MARS reactor, characterized 
by a thermal power of 100 MWth and by an integrated structure, a simplified calculation to 
evaluate the requested time to lead the reactor in a subcritical condition is carried out. The 
value of about 1300 ppm, requested to reach a subcritical condition and evaluated through 
neutronic calculation, is reached in less than 2 minutes. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Scheme of high concentration boron injection system 
 
Core cooling system and decay heat removal 
The decay heat removal function, especially in emergency conditions, is one of the main 
safety related features that must be continuously maintained. Generally this function can 
be actively guaranteed by high, medium and low injection systems that allow having 
enough coolant inventory to control the core temperature and by active circulating 
systems, equipped by pumps that accomplish the heat release to an external heat sink. 
According to the Utility Requirements, the decay heat removal function has to be 
guaranteed at least for 72 hours without any external intervention. To meet safety 
requirements, the circulating pumps and all the energized components, must be connected 
to the plant emergency power system; generally supplied by the emergency diesel 
generators. After the Fukushima accident, we shall consider also the possibility that the 
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plant emergency power system fails. This accident realized a great differentiation between 
completely passive actuated and operated systems and active actuated and operated 
systems. 
Below, a simplified treatment of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), used in 
traditional large size PWR, is carried out. In this context is clearly visible the advantages of 
SMRs, since they must release a lower thermal power to the external environment taking 
advantage of the coolants natural circulation even though velocity and heat transfer 
coefficients result lower. 
Standard GEN II PWRs solutions 
The ECCS has two main functions: to ensure the core coolability even after primary 
coolant losses, and the maintenance of subcritical conditions following the cooldown due 
to a Main Steam Line Break Accident (MSLBA). To ensure these functions the ECCS uses 
the same water source: the Refuelling Water Storage Tank (RWST). 
To perform the injection functions, four separate systems are foreseen: the high pressure 
injection system, the medium pressure injection system, the cold leg accumulators and the 
low pressure injection system. Each system is equipped by two redundant pumps, in 
parallel, each capable of providing the 100% of the required flow. These pumps are 
powered by the plant emergency power system; the only system among them that does 
not require power supply to operate is the cold leg accumulators. They operate with a 
pressurization made by nitrogen gas and when the primary pressure drops below the 
prefixed value, the nitrogen leads borated water into the RPV. 
The long term coolability of the core is guaranteed by the recirculation alignment of the 
ECCS. It takes water from the containment sump; thanks to the pumps, water flows 
through the residual heat removal system heat exchanger to be cooled, then the cooled 
water is sent back to the RPV. 
GEN III PWRs solutions 
Two different philosophies can be identified in the newest PWR reactor designs: 
1. Safety enhancement according to redundancy (four 100% systems), physical 
separation (each train is powered by the corresponding diesel generator and is 
completely independent from the others) and diversification criteria (different power 
supply systems can be powered the trains), based on active systems and actuating 
components. 
Safety Systems Suitable for any Nuclear Reactors, Especially for SMRs 
23 
 
2. Safety enhancement according to the minimization of the systems and components 
together with an intensive use of passive systems (core cooling function is ensured 
without any active system or component even if the actuation of the system requires 
an initial alignment of valves). 
Even if the two design philosophies are completely different, the main functions of both are 
the same: 
 Safety water injection to ensure the core cooling; 
 Decay heat removal from the core when the steam generators are no longer 
available. 
SMRs possible solutions 
Hereafter, two possible solutions applicable to SMRs will be analysed. The first solution is 
taken from the MARS reactor design while the second is a similar solution, developed for 
the mini-MARS project, with enhanced safety features concerning the unlimited operating 
time without any external intervention. 
The MARS ECCS is made up of three loops in series, a first loop where the primary 
coolant flows, a secondary loop to guarantee a sufficient number of barriers between the 
primary circuit and the external environment and, downstream of the secondary loop, there 
is a tertiary loop that allows system to release heat to the environment (see Fig. 5). The 
tertiary loop is composed by an atmospheric pressure pool, a condenser and connecting 
pipes. The condenser is a special atmospheric condenser able to condensate steam using 
atmospheric air as heat sink. Once the liquid water flows outside the condenser, thanks to 
the density difference between steam and liquid water, it is lead back to the pool to remove 
again the core decay heat from the upstream loops. 
The startup and operating conditions of the Safety Core Cooling System (SCCS) are 
completely passive; the system starts when a special check valve opens due to loss of 
primary coolant flow. The theoretical “unlimited” operating time of the MARS SCCS results 
in practice limited by the presence of uncondensable gases inside the atmospheric 
condenser that requires a system to remove them.  
An alternative solution, in order to overcome the problem related to uncondensable gases, 
has been developed, and some components patented, during studies carried out on the 
mini-MARS solution (see Fig. 6). The innovative solution, especially suitable for small size 
nuclear reactors, is characterized by three loops in series, all operating with coolant in 
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natural circulation, and by a pool. The three loops thermally connect the core and the pool, 
used as heat sink, guaranteeing the decay heat removal. The main difference, between 
the MARS and the mini-MARS solutions, is the absence of the atmospheric condenser and 
the consequent possibility to obtain a never ending heat sink. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Scheme of the MARS ECCS solution 
 
The pool, fill of water, guarantees a higher heat transfer coefficient during initial transient 
phase, when the thermal power to remove is higher. Afterwards, when the pool water 
inventory decreases, due to the water vaporization, the heat sink slowly and automatically 
shifts from water heat sink to an air only heat sink but, at the same time, the decay heat to 
be removed is decreased. 
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Fig. 6. Scheme of the mini-MARS ECCS solution 
 
In order to obtain a sufficient delay in the air only heat sink occurrence, making compatible 
the decay heat to remove with the heat transfer to a natural circulation air flow, the initial 
pool water inventory should be chosen large enough. 
 
Conclusions 
As conclusion of this analysis on engineering safety systems, many points, on which the 
attention has to be focused, are emerged: 
1. The SMRs, thanks to their small dimensions, can be easily managed, both 
concerning the construction and operability of the reactor (i.e. the possibility to 
avoid soluble neutron absorber during operating condition or the possibility to 
preassemble structures or systems before arriving on the plant site). 
2. The SMRs, by definition, have a limited core thermal power; this means a smaller 
decay heat to remove during shutdown condition. This feature allows using air as 
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heat sink to guarantee a never ending heat removal during reactor emergency 
conditions. The low heat transfer capability of the air and the low thermal power to 
release in the environment allow using finned heat exchanger with dimension small 
enough to be considered constructively and economic practicable. 
3. After Fukushima accident, it is predictable that emergency systems, also if their 
operation is required with a probability close to zero, should be based on passive 
concepts. A power plant where safety systems are passive and characterized by an 
unlimited operating period, without any external intervention, ensures a greater 
reliability also in the condition of loss of on and off site power. 
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4 SAFETY SYSTEMS SUITABLE FOR ANY 
NUCLEAR REACTOR, ESPECIALLY SMRS 
 According to the main nuclear reactors’ safety requirements (see also chapter 3), 
some systems to guarantee the decay heat removal in any accidental condition have 
been studied. In the present chapter, an activity focused on the development of a 
never ending heat sink, especially suitable for Small and Medium sized nuclear 
Reactors10 (SMRs), is presented. The heat sink is a special pool, whose operation is 
based on natural laws and special solutions that make it able to operate without any 
external intervention and for an unlimited period of time. 
4.1 Background of the invention 
The University of Rome “La Sapienza” (Department of Nuclear Engineering and 
Energy Conversion) developed, since the 1984, the design of an innovative SMR, 
PWR type: the MARS. The design of this reactor is characterized by many innovative 
solutions; the most important ones are: 
• the CPP – Containment for Primary loop Protection; 
• the ATSS – Additional Temperature-actuated Shutdown System; 
• the SCCS – Safety Core Cooling System. 
The first solution is aimed at avoiding the reactor vessel to be operate under a 
pressure difference between the inner volume (all primary coolant pressure 
boundary) and the outer zone. To meet this requirement, a second circuit, made of 
piping and vessels (larger than the piping and vessels of the primary coolant 
                                            
10 According to the IAEA definition, small nuclear reactors are characterized by an electric power less 
than 300MW while medium nuclear reactors by an electric power less than 700 MW. 
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pressure boundary), filled with pressurized cold water, encloses all primary coolant 
components, including the primary reactor vessel. This solution, guaranteeing an 
extreme reduction of any stress on the primary coolant pressure boundary 
components, including reactor vessel, practically eliminate any unlikely possibility of 
failure. Since the CPP encloses also the primary coolant loop, any LOCA occurrence 
is automatically avoided by design. 
The ATSS is an additional safety system, finalized to passively reach the condition of 
reactor shutdown, based on the differential thermal expansion of two concentric 
pipes made of metals characterized by different thermal expansion coefficients. 
The last system, the SCCS, is the most important one in relation to the present work. 
The SCCS is a completely passive safety system aimed at removing the decay heat 
from the reactor core without any external intervention (e.g. energized systems or 
components, plant operators, etc.) and for an unlimited period of time, exploiting the 
density difference between hot and cold legs to allow the coolant circulation. The 
SCCS system is characterized by three circuits in series (Figure 2): 
• the Primary Safety Circuit (PSC) through which the primary coolant flows; 
• the Intermediate Safety Circuit (ISC) though which subcooled water flows; 
• the Tertiary Safety Circuit (TSC) through which water and steam flow. 
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Figure 2. MARS SCCS circuits 
The tertiary circuit is equipped with a water pool at atmospheric pressure (at the 
beginning filled with cold water), a condenser and connection piping. During reactor 
normal operating condition, the pool is filled with subcooled water at ambient 
temperature. When the SCCS becomes operative, the heat removed from the 
primary coolant causes the water pool temperature increase. This temperature rises 
up to the saturation temperature (at a pressure slightly higher of the external 
atmospheric value) reaching the heat transfer condition of pool boiling; hence this 
sets the TSC temperature at about 100 °C. The produced steam, flowing through the 
TSC, releases the heat to the atmospheric air, condensing in a special condenser 
with an innovative design and turning back to the pool, in a closed two-phase loop 
(Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. MARS SCCS in operation 
 
The system can be automatically actuated by means of a special completely passive 
check valve (to comply with the redundancy criterion, a standard check valve is 
installed in parallel to this innovative component). The innovative check valve is kept 
in closed position exploiting the pressure difference between the reactor vessel inlet 
and outlet, corresponding respectively to the discharge and to the suction of the 
primary pump. The pressure difference is approximately proportional to the square of 
the mass flow rate through the reactor core. When the primary flow rate decreases 
and hence the pressure difference, the valve automatically opens allowing the 
primary coolant to flow through the SCCS. 
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Figure 4. MARS special check valve 
 
In the scheme of the innovative check valve (see Figure 4) the valve plug is 
represented in its upper position (valve closed); when the pressure difference 
between inlet and outlet of the reactor vessel is no longer sufficient to maintain the 
valve closed (due to a reduced coolant flow rate), the valve plug falls, allowing the 
primary coolant to flow through the primary loop of the SCCS. 
This system has very innovative features and its design introduced very important 
safety issues in conceiving new nuclear reactors designs. More recent projects have 
been characterized by enhanced safety features, never seen before the MARS 
project. 
Nevertheless, the SCCS shows some limits in a long period operation since no 
information related to the presence of noncondensable gases in the TSC are 
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predictable. A very limited amount of noncondensable gases within the steam can 
strongly reduce the heat transfer performance of the system, making it not able to 
release the decay heat to the atmosphere [5]. 
The presence of noncondensable gases strongly affects the global heat transfer 
performance since gases represent a thermal resistance at the vapor/condensate 
interface. Due to condensation phenomenon, vapor moves towards the heat transfer 
surface and condenses; noncondensable gases move with the vapor up to the cold 
heat transfer surface where they are accumulated. As direct consequence, the 
condensable partial pressure near the cold wall results to be reduced and hence the 
“driving force” for condensation is also reduced. Furthermore, the concentrated layer 
of noncondensable gases partially prevents the vapor from reaching the wall. For 
these two reasons the condensation rate is reduced even at a relatively low 
concentration of noncondensable gases. 
The presence of noncondensable gases would reduce the whole SCCS heat transfer 
performance making the system no-longer capable to completely remove the decay 
heat from the reactor core. Due to this not negligible problem, an off-gas system was 
studied to guarantee the noncondensable gases removal from the steam. 
An innovative system, which takes into account the problem of the noncondensable 
gases overcoming it, has been studied and is presented in the paragraphs below. 
 
4.2 Pool description 
The whole new DHR system has been conceived with a design similar to the MARS 
SCCS. The system11 proposed and here below described is the final heat sink and it 
is equipped with a special heat exchanger (PHX) that allows to release the decay 
heat to the atmosphere. In addition to the heat removal function, this top-reliable heat 
sink is characterized by special safety features and by a very high simplicity. The 
special design of the system allows good heat transfer capability, especially 
characterized by a functional trend that can easily be defined in order to follow the 
decay heat trend, and unlimited operating time without any external intervention. 
                                            
11 According to the IAEA definition, this system is a passive system that belongs to the Category “C” 
(see paragraph 3.1). 
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The PHX is made by the following main components: a pool, a separating septum 
and a heat exchanger (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Scheme of the PHX components 
 
In order to achieve a never-ending heat sink capability, the pool has been divided 
into two interconnected volumes separated by a special septum. In one of the two 
regions, there is the heat exchanger, while the other region does not contain any 
mechanical component. The innovative components, expressly developed for the 
special purposes of this system, are the heat exchanger and the separating septum, 
both characterized by a special design. 
The heat exchanger is made up of vertical tubes equipped with four special fins and 
arranged in a square matrix. Each fin is provided, in its bottom region, by vertical slits 
(Figure 6). Fins of adjacent tubes are linked together constituting about as many 
squared sub-channels as the tubes’ number, creating a vertical tube heat exchanger 
(Figure 7). 
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Figure 6. Single tube of the PHX 
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Figure 7. Layout of PHX (out of scale) 
 
The special design of the opened fins allows mixing the water throughout the pool 
crossing different adjacent sub-channels. Later, when the pool water level is 
significantly reduced (due to boiling depending on the decay heat removed), the 
vertical slits allow air to flow into the heat exchanger before the complete 
vaporization of the pool water, preventing any possibility to have flooding occurrence 
at the heat exchanger bottom edge. 
Thanks to the opened fins, the two bottom volumes of the pool are in communication, 
while in the upper region of the heat exchanger the two volumes are independent. At 
the beginning, in the stand-by condition, the water level should be maintained over 
the fins’ upper edge in order to facilitate the pool water heating, exploiting the whole 
heat capacity of the pool. Maintaining the water level higher than the fins allows 
natural circulation to easily establish within the pool. As for the fins, also the 
separating septum is provided by vertical openings in the bottom region to allow 
mixing water among adjacent sub-channels and to allow, later, an atmospheric air 
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flow through the heat exchanger sub-channels from the empty volume before the 
complete vaporization of the pool water. In Figure 7 an isometric view of the PHX is 
shown. In Figure 9 a detailed view of the PHX sub-channels with the vertical slits is 
shown. 
 
Figure 8. View of the PHX 
 
 
Figure 9. PHX detail of the sub-channels and the fins 
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4.3 Pool operating condition 
The special feature of the PHX system is its capability to release the heat to the 
water pool at the beginning and, after the complete water vaporization, to the 
atmospheric air. This shifting from the first to the last condition happens without any 
external intervention nor active systems/components nor plant operators. An 
accurate description of the AHX operating conditions is reported here below. The 
different phases of the pool operating condition are the following: 
- stand-by condition; 
- heating phase; 
- pool boiling condition; 
- mixed heat transfer condition (pool boiling in the lower part and air + steam 
convection in the upper one); 
- convection with air only, as heat sink. 
 
4.3.1 Stand-by Condition 
During the reactor normal operating condition, the whole DHR system, including the 
PHX (heat sink), is switched off by means of a passive check valve (Figure 10). The 
pool water level has to be maintained high enough to guarantee a sufficient system 
heat capacity. 
Upstream of the pool more than a single loop can be foreseen to provide a multi-
barrier protection between the primary coolant and the external atmosphere. For 
simplicity, in the Figure 10, the check valve has been represented on the last loop 
(for scheme simplification purposes only) despite the best solution foresees the 
check valve on the first loop. The solution that foresees the check valve on the first 
loop is preferable since the passive opening should be directly based on the primary 
circuit behavior. The check valve to isolate the circuit is required to minimize the 
thermal losses during reactor operating conditions preventing the coolant flow within 
the loops of the safety decay heat removal system. 
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The passive check valve has not been redesigned since the solution already 
developed for the MARS reactor could be easily applied to this system (only small 
changing to fit with the reactor size should be foreseen). 
 
 
Figure 10. PHX Stand-by condition 
 
4.3.2 Heating Phase 
When the DHR has to operate, the check valve is automatically opened allowing the 
coolant circulation. As already said, between the pool and the primary coolant, at 
least another loop should be foreseen, equipped with its own heat exchanger. If the 
check valve is installed on the primary loop of the DHR (where primary coolant 
flows), the coolant within the last loop would start to flow after the temperature has 
increased enough to guarantee a sufficient density difference between hot and cold 
legs. Once the coolant flows by natural circulation, the pool water, subcooled at the 
beginning, starts to increase its temperature up to the saturation point (Figure 11) 
thanks to internal mixing flows due to the density difference. 
Known the decay heat that has to be removed, and thanks to the free choice in the 
pool dimensions, the plant designer can easily define the time at which the saturation 
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temperature will be reached. From that time on, the pool boiling condition occurs and 
the water level starts to continually decrease. The right definition of pool operating 
condition timeline is of primary prominence since following the decay heat power 
trend, the pool dimensions can be optimized on the specific plant in which it has to be 
installed. 
 
Figure 11. PHX Heating Phase 
 
As an example, a comparison between two different solutions is here represented in 
order to understand the importance of the pool dimension on the transient timeline. 
Only the water heating period is here analyzed. The comparison has been carried out 
taking into account a large size nuclear reactor (design thermal power of 3600 MW) 
and a small nuclear reactor (design thermal power of 100 MW). 
The reference dimensions of the pool, for the comparison, are shown in Figure 12 
and Table 1. Since to be passively operative (exploiting the natural circulation) the 
pool has to be installed at higher level compared to the heat source, the pool should 
be installed on the top of the containment building or in an elevated area at the plant 
site (choice depending also on criteria of protection from external events). Obviously, 
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larger reactor size means larger pool and hence more critical design issues related to 
the large amount of water in the pool itself. 
 
 
Figure 12. Scheme of the pool dimensions 
 
Table 1. Pool reference dimensions 
Large (L) [ m ] 3.00 
Width (W) [ m ] 3.00 
Height (H) [ m ] 5.00 
Volume [ m3 ] 45.00 
 
The pool water heating is assumed to be from the ambient temperature (20 °C) up to 
the saturation point at atmospheric pressure (100 °C). In the geometrical condition 
above defined (see Table 1), , the energy (E) to be released to the water pool in 
order to reach the saturation point is about 1.5E+04 MJ. Since the decay heat 
produced by the core decreases with time, the required time to reach the saturation 
conditions (t*) in the pool has been evaluated by the equation (2.4) as follow: 
 
  
*
0 0.283
150
0.13tE P dt
t−
= ∫
  (4.1) 
 
 
 
 
L 
W 
H 
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The correlation here considered for the evaluation is the relation corresponding to the 
time range between 150 s and 4.0E+06 s, the correlations relating to the time before 
150 s have not been considered since at those times it is not credible that the natural 
circulation has been already established in all the circuits, including the water pool 
volume12 (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Comparison between two different core sizes 
P0 [ MWth ] 3600 100 
time [ s ] 150 12240 
Paverage [ MWth ] 102 1.22 
P/P0 [ % ] 2.82 1.22 
 
The very limited period of time such as that evaluated for the large sized nuclear 
reactor, is not acceptable because the temperature of loops would increase too 
much, leading to unacceptable conditions. 
What has been said means that this system could be efficiently installed to systems 
characterized by a limited thermal power. For larger nuclear reactors, this system 
could be evenly installed but the large dimensions that the pool would have, make 
interesting a plant solution based on the redundance criterion. Indeed, a large 
nuclear reactor with a thermal rate power of about 3600 MWth requires a DHRS that 
could be sized on approximately 30 MWth (less than 1% of the design power). In 
order to reduce the thermal power to be removed by a single PHX system, four pools 
with a 50% capability (about 15 MWth each) can be foreseen. In this condition, only 
two operating pools (2x50%) are required to completely remove the decay heat from 
the primary circuit, guaranteeing at the same time a limited size for each single pool. 
4.3.3 Pool Boiling Condition 
Once the saturation temperature has been reached, the pool boiling condition within 
the pool guarantees higher heat transfer coefficient and hence a higher heat removal 
capability. 
                                            
12 During first transient period, before the natural circulation is established, the whole system 
temperature increases and later, when the DHRS is able to remove more heat than the decay power, 
the system temperature starts to decrease. 
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The pool boiling condition at atmospheric pressure sets the temperature at 100 °C 
and the high heat transfer coefficient characterizing this heat transfer mechanism, 
limits at about the same temperature, the lower temperature of the last loop of the 
DHR. Water vaporization from the pool causes the water level reduction during time 
and hence a reduction of the “active” heat transfer surface of the PHX. 
 
Figure 13. PHX Pool Boiling Condition 
 
4.3.4 Mixed Heat Transfer Condition 
 
As the water level decreases, the reduction of the heat transfer surface is acceptable 
up to a certain value; beyond that value, unacceptable conditions would be reached if 
a special solution, to increase the heat removal capability of the system, is not 
foreseen (the loss of water up to the bottom region of the pool would prevent the 
PHX from cooling). 
In order to compensate the heat transfer surface reduction, due to the level variation, 
the system has been especially designed to allow air entering and flowing through 
the PHX before the complete vaporization of the pool water. Thanks to the specially 
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designed openings on the fins and on the separating septum, an atmospheric air flow 
can contribute to the heat removal before the water complete vaporization. 
 
Figure 14. PHX Mixed Heat Transfer Condition 
 
The height of the fins is defined by the designer in order to control the maximum 
temperature that will be reached, without any criticality, within the primary loop. This 
condition is present until the water complete vaporization. 
 
4.3.5 Air Only Heat Sink Condition 
Once water is completely vaporized, the heat removal is guaranteed by air only. The 
most critical condition during the whole transient period is usually reached at the 
moment in which the complete water vaporization occurs. 
This last operating condition guarantees a never-ending heat removal capability. The 
heat transfer coefficient and performance reduction, due to the shift from water to air 
heat sink, is compensated by the reduction, during the transient time, of the decay 
heat produced by the core. 
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Figure 15. PHX Air Only Heat Sink Condition 
 
The heat transfer coefficient is higher when the PHX operates with water, while air 
allows to remove a lower amount of power for an unlimited time in the last period of 
the transient; it should be noticed that the heat transfer coefficient roughly follows the 
trend of the decay heat generated in the reactor core after the shutdown. 
Many degrees of freedom are left to the designer who should size the pool so that 
the shifting to the air only heat sink condition is sufficiently delayed in time, to be 
compatible with the reactor decay heat produced, preventing any unacceptable 
condition. At the same time the heat exchanger dimensions (i.e. tube number, length, 
diameter and pitch to diameter ratio) allow to increase the peak heat removal 
capability. A good design should take into account both these features to optimize 
the system to the specific application case. 
The main features of the system are the high availability and reliability. Due to its 
static components, the system does not require intervention during stand-by 
conditions (only the valve has to be opened to guarantee the heat removal, but a 
special passive valve, such as the MARS one, can be adopted). 
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Many correlations have been found for natural convection on a vertical plane wall in 
open field; however, the geometry of the system creates many vertical channels, 
heated from the surface, in which the chimney effect takes place. In this condition, 
the air through the PHX will not behave according to a natural convection flow in an 
open field, but rather will behave in a forced flow. For this reason, the heat transfer 
coefficient has been evaluated, by means of an iterative process, with simpler 
correlation related to forced convection. The iterative process is necessary to 
evaluate the heat transfer coefficient in natural circulation condition since it depends 
on the mass flow rate that is a function of the density difference between hot and cold 
legs, which in turn depends on the heat transfer coefficient itself13. For the reference 
solution, applied to a nuclear reactor with a design thermal power of about 100 
MW14, the average heat transfer coefficient results to be about 12 W m-2 K-1. 
  
                                            
13 the Dittus-Boelter correlation has been used for the evaluation of the heat transfer coefficient in the 
air only heat sink condition: 
0.8 0.40.023 Re PrNu = ⋅ ⋅  
Where: 
 Nu is the Nusselt number [ ]: 
h DNu
k
⋅
=  
 Re is the Reynolds number [ ]: 
Re u Dρ
µ
⋅ ⋅
=
 
 Pr is the Prandtl number [ ]: 
Pr p
c
k
µ⋅
=
 
 
14 The reference condition is equal to that described in the paper reported in the paragraph 4.4. 
Safety Systems Suitable for any Nuclear Reactors, Especially for SMRs 
46 
 
4.4 Paper on the innovative pool 
Journal: Energy 
Year: 2012 
Volume: 45 
Issue: 1 
Pages: 296 - 303 
Title: An innovative pool with a passive heat removal system 
Authors: D. Vitale Di Maio, A. Naviglio, F. Giannetti, F. Manni 
doi: 10.1016/j.energy.2012.03.053 
 
Abstract: 
Heat removal systems are of primary importance in several industrial processes. As heat 
sink, a water pool or atmospheric air may be selected. The first solution takes advantage 
of high heat transfer coefficient with water but it requires active systems to maintain a 
constant water level; the second solution takes benefit from the unlimited heat removal 
capacity by air, but it requires a larger heat exchanger to compensate the lower heat 
transfer coefficient. In nuclear power plants during a nuclear reactor shutdown, as well as 
in some chemical plants to control runaway reactions, it is possible to use an innovative 
heat sink that joins the advantages of the two previous solutions. This solution is based 
on a special heat exchanger submerged in a water pool designed so that when heat 
removal is requested, active systems are not required to maintain the water level; due to 
the special design, when the pool is empty, atmospheric air becomes the only heat sink. 
The special heat exchanger design allows to have a heat exchanger without being 
oversized and to have a system able to operate for unlimited period without external 
interventions. This innovative system provides an economic advantage as well as 
enhanced safety features. 
 
Keywords: 
Heat exchanger, Nuclear, Passive systems, Residual heat removal system, Emergency 
Core Cooling System. 
 
Introduction 
In the core of nuclear reactors, when a shutdown occurs, fission chain reaction is 
stopped but, because of decay heat release by fuel, thermal power generation 
continues at considerable levels for a long time. In order to avoid the occurrence of a 
severe accident, safety systems (Decay Heat Removal Systems - DHRS) aimed at 
removing this thermal power, have safety functions of primary prominence. Quite 
demanding features are required to these systems, first of all regarding availability 
and reliability. The function of decay heat removal can be achieved through different 
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systems, characterized by active or passive components. Both types of these safety 
systems must have all components in a safety grade class but the main difference, 
between active and passive systems, is due to their dependence on external 
mechanical or electrical power, signals or forces. Thanks to the reliance on natural 
laws only, passive systems require a lower number of components. Because of these 
features, DHRS are often based on passive systems in order to obtain higher safety 
performance with fewer components. 
 
The advantages of a completely static emergency decay 
heat removal system: impact on system reliability and plant 
safety 
Because of the limited number of components involved in passive systems and the 
independence from human intervention, their use produces both economic 
advantages and safety enhancement. 
Safety systems must have at least two different states: the first one corresponds to 
the normal operating condition and the second one corresponds to the safety 
operating condition. In order to change from normal to safety condition, and to be 
able to operate in safety conditions, it will be necessary to have: a signal to detect the 
need, a driving force to change the state and the necessary means to operate in the 
new state. If these three features rely on passive components, the system may be 
defined as passive. 
Both systems, active and passive, have to be design according to the redundancy 
criterion. Moreover, an important difference between moving and static systems 
exists. The more similar the two operating states of a system are the less failure 
modes of the system will be. According to this, passive systems are classified, by the 
IAEA [1], in four different classes (from lower to higher passive characteristics) 
depending on their main features, i.e. mechanical moving parts, moving fluids, 
requirement of input signals. 
The innovative system here proposed, is characterized by only moving fluids. Only a 
valve has a mechanical moving part, to allow the interception of the decay heat 
removal system during normal operating conditions. The simplified scheme Fig. 1 
shows the valve present in the system, the only moving part of the whole safety 
system. This component is not analyzed in this paper, but different solutions have 
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been studied and developed to design a passive component which may belong to the 
highest class for passive systems with mechanical moving parts. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Simplified scheme of the upstream loops of the innovative DHRS. 
 
The rest of the system has, theoretically, no possibility to fail. The particular 
configuration of the system, and the only safety purpose that it has, allows easy 
ISI&R operations to further minimize the failure rate. 
Since to develop a project, especially if it is innovative, it is necessary to identify all 
the failure modes and to define the failure rates of each system or component, a 
system equipped by static components is characterized by less branches in the event 
tree, that bring to core damage. 
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In a level 1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PSA), the overall CDF is the lowest if 
static components are used, if passive components are minimized and if active 
components are avoided. 
Possible solutions proposed: principles of operation 
Usually decay heat removal systems use air or water as heat sink. The choice of the 
heat sink to adopt has to be based on the following criteria:  
 The use of water allows to have higher heat transfer coefficient; 
 The use of air allows to have unlimited operating time. 
These different solutions are used in modern nuclear reactors [2]. For example, the 
ESBWR is equipped with a passive decay heat removal system releasing heat to a 
volume of subcooled water at the beginning of the transient and to boiling water later 
(the isolation condenser). Since no passive systems, aimed at maintaining the water 
pool inventory are present, a limited operating time of about 72 h is reachable without 
any external intervention. The VVER-1000, instead, has a passive decay heat 
removal system based on air heat exchangers releasing heat to the atmospheric air. 
This system uses the secondary side of steam generators to release heat to the 
atmosphere and valves to allow the circulation, it is characterized by an unlimited 
time of operating capability. The use of air as heat sink makes larger the air-cooled 
heat exchanger since it has to guarantee the residual heat removal from the system 
just after the reactor shutdown. 
The choice of a water heat sink, thanks to the high heat transfer coefficients, is 
preferable in the presence of natural circulation systems because, for the same heat 
transfer surface, a lower temperature difference, between the hot fluid and the heat 
sink, is sufficient to start the system circulation. Lower temperature difference is as 
important as a cascade of loops in series, between the heat source (reactor core) 
and the heat sink. Since the heat sink temperature binds the upstream circuits’ 
temperatures, the presence of water in the heat sink allows the system to keep 
temperatures lower up to the primary coolant. 
In order to satisfy the utility requirements [3], the initial water inventory has to be 
large enough to allow 72 hours of safety operating conditions without any external 
intervention (neither systems nor operators). After 72 hours, it is foreseen the 
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possibility to refill the water inventory thanks to active systems (pumps) or from 
outside (fire-fighter supply). 
An air heat sink ensures an unlimited operating time without either operator or other 
system interventions. On the other hand, due to low air heat transfer coefficient, a 
higher LMTD is required with other conditions being the same. The starting of natural 
circulation will be smoother; if the safety system is equipped by multiple loops in 
series, the maximum coolant temperature at the exit of the core will not be limited as 
in the previous case. This problem can be compensated by an over-sized heat 
transfer surface that would result in a more expensive heat exchanger and larger 
space. The heat transfer surface has to be designed to remove the maximum decay 
heat, unless an additional heat capacity is provided. Since the decay heat trend is 
decreasing, the highest power is to be removed only during the first transient phases 
and the heat exchanger will have a heat transfer surface larger than necessary 
during the quasi-steady state of the transient. 
 
Description of the new-design, top-reliability heat sink for 
never ending decay heat removal system 
Taking into account experiences gained in the MARS project [4] [5] and in particular 
concerning the passive DHR system, a new DHR, mainly suitable for small/medium 
sized nuclear reactors, has been developed and it is here described. 
The DHRS of the MARS [6] is characterized by three loops in series where the most 
important one, due to its innovative features, is the last one. In the first and second 
circuits there is respectively, primary coolant and intermediate water. The hot water, 
from the second circuit, passes through a heat exchanger, characterized by 
horizontal tubes, releasing heat to the water presents within a pool.  
The last loop is made up of a pool, a condenser, that allow to remove a large amount 
of heat thanks to the high latent vaporization heat of water at atmospheric pressure 
[7], and piping to connect both components. Therefore, the last loop is a closed 
circuit. During safety operating condition, after an initial transient period due to the 
reaching of the saturation condition in the pool, water vaporizes first and condenses 
later, releasing heat to the external atmosphere by means of the same atmospheric 
condenser which is installed inside a cooling tower (the atmospheric condenser uses 
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air as heat sink; since the loop is closed it limits the loss of steam from the pool 
inventory to atmosphere and the water amount remains constant). The features of 
this system allow an almost unlimited operating time because it exploits air as heat 
sink and water, in closed loop, in all upstream circuits (only the atmospheric 
condenser has a small communication path between steam and air). Due to the 
system features, it is possible an accumulation of incondensable gases in the 
system. Since the presence of incondensable gases strongly affects the heat transfer 
characteristics of the system, a special system to flush out the gases was developed. 
For this reason, it is difficult to assess precisely the time length of capability of the 
system to operate without any external interventions (even if this may be expected as 
quite high). 
Taking into account the above considerations, a new innovative system, 
characterized by a top-reliable heat sink, has been developed. Hereafter, the 
description will focus on the innovative heat sink features, while the upstream 
systems will be described only for the operating condition description. The heat sink 
is made up of a pool, directly connected to the atmosphere, a heat exchanger placed 
inside the pool and a special separating septum. Therefore, in the innovative 
solution, the water contained in the pool at the beginning will not be maintained 
during the transient phases (the heat sink will shift from subcooled water to air, 
passing through the pool boiling condition). 
During normal operating condition of the plant, this system is in a stand-by condition 
characterized by: pool volume completely filled, subcooled water, and the fluid (i.e. 
water) within the heat exchanger tubes, stationary and at the same temperature as 
that of the water pool. The innovative system uses, as heat sink, water during the first 
transient phases and air later on, in order to join the advantages of high heat transfer 
coefficient of water, when heat to remove is greater, and air to have an unlimited 
period of system operating conditions (see Fig. 2). The operating conditions of the 
DHRS are characterized by three different stages established by the pool heat sink 
conditions; during the first stage of the transient, heat removal is guaranteed by the 
water present in the pool, later the heat sink is provided by air flow only. The change 
from the water heat sink to the air heat sink mode is not instantaneous: the shift is 
long enough to allow the complete vaporization of the water initially presents in the 
pool. The period characterized by a hybrid heat sink, water plus air, hereafter will be 
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defined transition period. The target of the system is to guarantee the heat removal 
during all the three periods. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Scheme of the heat removal system’s operating conditions: a) initial condition and during water heating 
up to saturation, b) boiling water condition with decreasing of its level, c) mixed heat sink with boiling water 
and air flow coexistence, d) air only heat sink: never ending operations. The horizontal dotted line is the upper 
edge of the openings. 
 
During these periods the heat transfer mechanisms are specific of each phase. In the 
first phase, when the pool is filled by subcooled water, the water level has to be high 
enough to completely overcome the heat exchanger tubes and the separating 
septum. In this condition, the warming water within the heat exchanger tubes will 
have a lower density compared with that of water presents inside the empty volume 
of the pool. The density gradient between the two pool volumes allows having a 
natural circulation through them and the whole heat capacity of the water pool will be 
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exploited. In this way the start of the air only heat sink phase will be delayed. In this 
phase the heat transfer capability of the system is guaranteed by the natural 
convection condition on the pool side of the heat exchanger (see Fig. 2-a). 
When boiling condition occurs the pool water level decreases. As soon as the free 
level reaches a height lower than the separating septum the pool boiling heat transfer 
condition will be reached. In this condition the cold water replacement within the pool 
volume is guaranteed only by communicating vessels principle rather than natural 
circulation due to density gradient (see Fig. 2-b). The main contribution to heat 
removal during the boiling period phase is due to boiling water, but a contribution 
which increase with decreasing level is due to the steam flow produced from the pool 
bulk. Once the openings are uncovered starts the transition period, in which the heat 
sink is made up of steam produced by the vaporization together with the air flowing 
through the septum openings (see Fig. 2-c). In this condition air flows in natural 
circulation and the steam flow within the heat exchanger enhanced the contribution of 
the air flow thanks to the chimney effect. During the transient period the lower zone 
of the heat transfer surface will be cooled by pool boiling condition while the upper 
zone by a mixed flow of air and steam. The contribution of the two different 
components changes during the transient from steam only to air only flow. 
During the last transient phase, when air only heat sink phase occurs, the two 
volumes are filled by air. The empty volume will contain cold air while the heat 
exchanger volume will contain the hot air. The temperature difference that will 
establish between the two volumes is high enough to have natural circulation of air 
within the heat exchanger. In this condition the heat will be removed by convection 
on the pool side (see Fig. 2-d), as well as during the first transient phase with 
subcooled water within the pool. 
On the tube side, within the heat exchanger, the flowing condition remains the same 
during the three different phases. The fluid can be flow in natural or forced 
convection, depending on the design features, but in any case the decay heat is 
removed by the convection heat transfer mechanism. 
To achieve these purposes, the pool volume is divided into two interconnected 
regions, separated by a special septum. In the first region, the heat exchanger is 
placed, while the other region does not contain any mechanical component. The 
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innovative components expressly designed for this system are the heat exchanger 
and the separating septum, both with particular features.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Views of main parts of the innovative heat exchanger: a) an isometric view of the heat exchanger, b) 
zoom of a single finned tube, c) the separating septum with openings. 
 
The heat exchanger is made up of vertical tubes, arranged in a squared matrix, 
equipped by four special fins. The fins of adjacent tubes are linked each other 
constituting about as many squared sub-channels as the tubes number (see Fig. 3-
a). Each fin is provided, in the bottom part, by vertical openings, that allow mixing 
water of adjacent sub-channels first, and air flow during the transition heat removal 
period (see Fig. 3-b). In this way, the bottom volumes of the pool are in 
communication, while the upper volumes, upper heat exchanger tubes and upper 
empty volumes are independent. As for the fins, the separating septum is provided 
by vertical openings in the bottom region to allow air, from the empty volume, to 
reach the heat exchanger sub-channels (see Fig. 3-c).  
The main features of the system are the high availability and the reliability. Due to its 
static components, the system does not require intervention during stand-by 
conditions. The only thing that has to be ensured is a level high enough to allow the 
pool to contain a water inventory sufficient to delay the passage to the air-only heat 
sink when the decay heat to remove is reduced to a selected, proper value. During 
normal plant operation, the level of the pool was not monitored, since the pool is 
communicating with the external environment, the desired water inventory would not 
be assured due to evaporation. 
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Advantages of the innovative system 
Many advantages are achievable with the use of this system, that make it interesting 
especially for nuclear power plants. Concerning the use of the system in NPPs, it 
could be easier to foresee this system if the size of the plant has a small/medium 
size. In this way, when the air-only heat sink operates, a quite limited thermal power 
(few MW) has to be removed, allowing to foresee a small heat exchanger. 
Concerning chemical plants, a system of this type can be applied to the plant 
foreseeing the possibility of a runaway reaction. The main advantages achievable 
are: 
 High capability to decay heat removal during the first period after the reactor 
shutdown, exploiting the high heat transfer coefficient of water; 
 Long term operability without any external intervention, thanks to the 
automatic shift from the water heat sink to the air heat sink. 
 Compact heat exchanger, since the air-only heat sink takes the place of the 
water heat sink when a quite smaller power has to be removed. 
 Possibility to delay the occurrence of the air-only heat sink simply increasing 
the water inventory initially present in the pool (the empty volume side can be 
enlarged as desired). 
The RELAP5 model used for the system 
The reference system is an evolution of the MARS design; it is called mini-MARS, 
since it is applied to a plant characterized by a lower power, in addition to an 
integrated structure, a higher pressure and several innovative concepts; 
nevertheless, the applicability to plants with quite higher power level is absolutely 
possible. The DHRS is characterized by three loops; in the first one the primary 
coolant flows, in the secondary and in the tertiary ones, water flows, allowing the 
system to release the heat power to the external atmosphere. The presence of the 
second loop is required according to multi barriers criterion between primary system 
and external environment. 
The simulation of the operating condition was carried out through a simplified model 
developed ad hoc and using the RELAP5/mod3.3 software [8], for an independent 
analysis. A simplified scheme of the system and the correspondent RELAP5 
representation are shown in Fig. 4.  
Safety Systems Suitable for any Nuclear Reactors, Especially for SMRs 
56 
 
The RELAP5 simulation was carried out in two different steps. The first period is 
characterized by the heating of the pool water from initial temperature to saturation 
condition and by the period required to have a vaporization of water large enough to 
have pool level lower than the openings. The second period is characterized by the 
air-only heat sink. In this way, a conservative assumption was applied: in fact, the 
transition period in which both boiling water and air constitute the heat sink, are 
represented by an air-only heat sink, in which performance results strongly lower 
than in reality.  
Due to this assumption, when the change of model occurs, trends of temperatures 
and mass flow, as well as the thermal heat removed by the pool, are characterized 
by visible discontinuities. Thanks to the special geometry of the system, due to the 
vertical openings in the structure, when the air contribution starts to be present, from 
the time when the water level drops below the top level of the openings, a high 
contribution to heat removal from the boiling water is still present. The geometry 
prevents the occurrence of flooding conditions, in which boiling water prevents air to 
enter into the heat exchanger volume. In this way, the assumption made is very 
conservative but totally coherent to show the effectiveness of the heat sink system. In 
Fig. 4, the models used for the water and air heat sinks are shown; the model of the 
water-only heat sink is represented in a conventional way, while the model in which 
an air flow is present required some other components represented by dotted lines. 
Concerning the RELAP5 model of the innovative heat exchanger, components of 300 
and 400 series are the most important since they are respectively the tube and the 
pool sides of the heat exchanger. During the first transient phase, only the pool and 
the outlet atmosphere are represented while the heat sink is composed by subcooled 
water. The outlet atmosphere is necessary to allows steam flowing outside the pool 
volume after the saturation condition is reached. Conservative assumption was made 
during the first transient period, since openings and connections, between the two 
pool volumes, were neglected during the subcooled period. This assumption implies 
a pool condition and natural circulation between the two different volumes of the pool 
is neglected; in this condition the total heat capacity of the pool and the heat transfer 
coefficient on the pool side are underestimate. 
Once the saturation condition is reached the produced steam is released in the outlet 
atmosphere, represented by a volume where pressure and temperature as boundary 
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conditions are imposed. Change of the nodalization occurs when the pool level is 
lower enough to uncover the openings; in this condition the residual boiling water will 
be neglected and an air only heat sink will be simulated. In order to guarantee the 
natural circulation condition for the air flow, since the pool condition heat transfer with 
air would result excessively conservative, some other junctions and volumes are 
added. In particularly, beyond the outlet atmosphere also the inlet atmosphere is 
represented, by the 440 volume, with the same boundary conditions of the outlet one. 
Since cold air and hot air have to be represented in two different volumes to allow 
natural circulation simulation, the downcomer (volume 430) is added for the pool air 
flow. In the air only heat sink condition, the addition of the volume 430 causes an 
increasing in the pool volume that is not strictly connected with the real geometry. 
This difference between the reality and the model does not cause errors since, when 
the total heat capacity of the system is one of the main parameters (pool in 
subcooled condition), the pool volume is equal to the real geometry and when natural 
circulation occurs (during the air only heat sink condition), highs and pressure drop 
are equal to the real geometry since they are the main parameters. 
During the air only heat sink, the mean heat transfer coefficient on the pool side was 
evaluated before and imposed in the RELAP5 input. The maximum uncertainty of the 
heat transfer coefficient could be up to 30%. Anyway, the instantaneously neglecting 
of the residual boiling water within the pool volume allows having large margins of 
conservatism in the system heat transfer capability. 
The RELAP5 model description is limited to the atmospheric heat sink and to the 
corresponding loop since the study is aimed at focusing the heat removal capability 
of the DHRS. Even though the detailed RELAP5 model of the whole circuits is not 
described, it is shown in Fig. 4 where the upstream loop, with its own heat 
exchanger, which ensures a physical separation between the outer loop and the 
primary coolant, is visible.  
The heat removal, both with water and with air heat sinks, occurs thanks to natural 
laws since water and air employ the density difference between the cold column of 
fluid (inlet condition) and the hot column of fluid (outlet condition) as driving force. 
The operating pressure of the loops will be defined, in each application, so that the 
maximum temperature reached is, in any case, lower than the corresponding 
saturation temperature. 
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Fig. 4. RELAP5 model of the innovative DHRS. 
 
 
The main features of interest in the operating simulation are listed in Tab. 1. 
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Tab. 1. Main features of the system used for the simulation 
 Value Unit of 
measure 
lt 5 m 
nt 1800 - 
pat 0.101 MPa 
.
Q 0 100 MW 
t0a 20 °C 
t0w 30 °C 
V0w 40 m3 
 
Example of operation of the innovative system, with 
reference to a SMR  
In this section, an example of the operating conditions of the innovative system is 
described. The reference conditions are Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power where, due 
to the characteristics of the system, the intervention of safety systems has been 
assumed in accordance with the following time scale. 
Tab. 2. Scheduled actions during simulation 
Time, s Action 
0  Steady state. 
10  Primary pumps disconnection; 
 Start closuring of insulating valves of feed water and steam line of 
secondary circuit. 
11  SCRAM; 
 End closure of insulating valves, of feed water and steam line of 
secondary circuit. 
11.85  Start opening of DHRS passive check valve. 
~ 56000  Resolution model is changed since pool level reaches openings 
upper edge (from boiling water heat sink to air-only heat sink). 
 
Simulation of the safety operating condition is carried out for 72 hours after the 
reactor trip in order to satisfy the utility requirements. The time value when the 
change of the heat sink model is applied was identified through an appropriate 
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control variable defined according to the geometric characteristics of the system 
(level from which fins and septum are provided with openings). 
Following pictures (from Fig. 5 to Fig. 11) show the behavior of the DHRS, regarding 
parameters of interest. 
The mass flow and temperatures of the ultimate loop of the DHRS (Fig. 5 and Fig. 6) 
show two different behaviors before and after the time value of 56000 s, at which the 
model change occur. During the first period mass flow rate presents a decreasing 
trend due to the reduction of the decay heat produced from the core. After the 
change of model due to the lower air heat transfer capability temperatures in the loop 
start to rise in order to have a larger temperature difference between external air and 
intermediate water, this allows system to continue the heat removal process. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Mass flow trend in the last loop. 
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Fig. 6. Cold (dotted line) and hot (solid line) legs temperatures in the last loop. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Primary coolant temperatures, at inlet (dotted line) and at outlet (solid line) of the core 
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What happen inside the pressure vessel is very important, since the maximum 
coolant temperatures are reached at the core outlet. As visible (see Fig. 7), except 
for the first phase of the transient, primary coolant temperatures have been 
decreased; the time value, at which an increasing is reported, corresponds with the 
change of the heat sink.  
Performance of the DHRS is evaluable by the comparison between decay heat 
produced in the core and removed heat from the heat sink. In order to evaluate the 
decay heat produced in the core, in the RELAP5 model the standard correlation ANS 
5.1-1973 is used. Due to a delay requested for the starting of the DHRS, during the 
first period the decay heat is higher than the removed heat. This conduct to an 
increasing of the primary coolant temperatures, afterwards the released heat 
becomes higher and reactor has led to the cold shutdown condition. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Decay heat power: Thermal power produced into the core (solid line) and removed by the innovative heat 
sink (dotted line). 
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Fig. 9. Decay heat power: Thermal power produced into the core (solid line) and removed by the innovative 
pool (dotted line) during the air only heat sink period. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Innovative pool behavior: Mean temperature trend (solid line) within a middle pool volume compared 
with the saturation temperature (dotted line). 
 
Safety Systems Suitable for any Nuclear Reactors, Especially for SMRs 
64 
 
Concerning the pool, the behavior of a middle height volume is considered for the 
temperature (Fig. 10). During operating condition pool water starts to rise its 
temperature reducing its density. The reduction in density causes a decrease in the 
saturation temperature since the static pressure due to the fluid column above is 
reduced. The water in the pool increases its temperature from starting condition to 
saturation. From this moment, the vaporization of the boiling water from the upper 
volumes, saturation temperatures and water level start to decrease (Fig. 11). 
Simulation of this first period was stopped when the openings started to be 
uncovered to allow changing the heat sink model. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Innovative pool behavior: trend of the pool water level. 
 
Conclusions 
Due to safety requirements for NPPs, the availability of safety systems, as well as 
their reliability, is of primary importance. The innovative DHRS presented in this 
paper, shows some interesting aspects that allow minimizing the heat sink system 
dimensions, guaranteeing a high capability in heat removal when the core decay heat 
power is still high, thanks to the presence of water, and at the same time, a never 
ending heat sink thanks to the air. 
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Because of the conservative assumptions applied, the real trend of main parameters 
during the transition phase would be smoother than that with the change of air-only 
heat sink model. The evaluated values of process parameters are representative of 
the real phenomenon only before the transition phase and after the complete 
vaporization of the pool water.  
The requirement of 72 hours without any external interventions can be easily 
achieved with this system. The features of the system allow designers to select the 
intervention delay, of the air only heat sink condition, to any value, simply changing 
the pool dimensions and the height of opening’s upper edge. These features make 
the innovative system particularly attractive for small/medium size nuclear reactors. 
Since, after a limited period of time, it is sufficient to remove a thermal power of about 
1% of the rated power, in a small/medium reactor, this value results low enough to be 
completely removed through an air-only heat sink, keeping the heat exchanger with 
very compact dimensions. 
In standard DHRSs used in operating power plants, after a certain period of time it is 
necessary to refill the pool, used as heat sink, with water from outside in order to 
maintain the inventory. In special conditions, in which the power plant zone could be 
affected by flood or other types of events, it can be very difficult, or at worst not 
possible, to recover the inventory of water used as heat sink before it finishes. In 
these conditions benefits ensured by the innovative system here proposed, in term of 
safety, result very clear since it does not require any refill operation of the water 
inventory. Unlike other passive systems used in operating nuclear power plants, the 
DHR here proposed allows to simultaneously obtain an unlimited period of operation 
without any external intervention of operators and a heat exchanger small enough to 
be considered cost effective. 
 
Nomenclature 
Acronyms 
CDF  Core Damage Frequency 
DHRS  Decay Heat Removal System 
ISI&R  In-Service Inspection & Repair 
LMTD  Log Mean Temperature Difference 
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NPP  Nuclear Power Plant 
PSA  Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Symbols 
.
Q   thermal power, MW 
n  number  
l  height, m 
V  volume, m3 
t  temperature, °C 
p  pressure, MPa  
Subscripts and superscripts 
0  initial condition 
a  air 
at  atmosphere (inlet and outlet) 
t  heat exchanger tubes 
w  water 
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4.5 The innovative pool and the Fukushima accident 
The new system designed can provide special safety performance to the nuclear 
reactor itself. Especially after the Fukushima accident, the importance of very reliable 
and highly available DHRSs has been shown to be fundamental for the system safety 
and the management of any accidental condition. In the Fukushima NPP the most 
important problem was to guarantee the decay heat removal both from the reactor 
cores and from the spent fuel pools. Since the Emergency Core Cooling Systems 
(ECCS) were completely based on active components, pumps and emergency diesel 
generators were required to remove the decay heat. The tsunami flooded the 
emergency diesels and moved away the fuel tanks preventing the functioning of any 
available source of power needed for the pumps’ operation. Should the tsunami had 
not flooded the diesels and moved away the fuel tanks, the condition of the site 
inaccessibility would probably have caused issues related to provide new fuel on the 
site to feed the emergency diesels. Some pictures of the Fukushima site conditions 
after the seismic and the tsunami events are reported below (Figure 16, Figure 17, 
Figure 18 and Figure 19). It is clearly visible that the damages and debris caused by 
these events make it harder any possibility of external intervention on the emergency 
safety systems. In this context, the characteristic advantages of the innovative pool 
heat sink here proposed are even more interesting. The standard design solutions 
and the Utility Requirements [7] foresee a system independence of at least 72 hours 
without any external intervention. The possibility of having a completely passive 
system, without any pump and power sources, able to operate for an unlimited period 
of time, makes this system especially suitable for the decay heat removal of nuclear 
power plants in emergency conditions. The analysis described in the previous 
paragraph (see 4.4) is referred to a SMR; since the Fukushima units were larger, the 
pool should have had larger dimensions to guarantee a sufficient delay in the air-only 
heat sink occurrence. This also implies special design issues to place the pool heat 
sinks accordingly to the plant layout. The design issues include the optimization 
between the maximization of the difference of height between the heat source and 
the heat sink and the minimization of the loop piping lengths. 
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Figure 16. Near the Fukushima Power Plant 
 
 
Figure 17. Street in the Fukushima Dai-ichi site 
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Figure 18. Street in the Fukushima Dai-ichi site 
 
 
Figure 19. Debris after the tsunami in the Fukushima Dai-ichi site 
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Due to safety requirements for NPPs, the availability of safety systems, as well as 
their reliability, is of primary importance. The innovative DHRS studied shows many 
interesting aspects that allow reducing the heat sink system dimensions, optimizing 
the pool dimensions to delay enough the pool boiling condition occurrence and hence 
the air-only heat sink. The adoption of this special system guarantees a high 
capability in heat removal when the decay heat to remove is still high, thanks to the 
sub-cooled pool water, and at the same time, a never ending heat sink exploiting the 
atmospheric air when the decay heat to be removed is lower. During normal 
operating conditions, some operative issues related to the pool water should be 
taken into account. The main parameters that can affect the system performance are 
related to the surrounding environmental conditions (e.g. temperature, humidity, etc.). 
Remote areas where SMRs are especially suitable to be installed can be 
characterized by extreme environmental conditions as very low or very high 
temperatures. Some solutions have been also hypothesized to comply with the sites’ 
special requirements: 
 High temperature environment: 
The loops that are foreseen upstream to the PHX are completely closed and 
the coolant circulation is prevented by dedicated check valves. In this solution 
the pool can be designed to have a volume large enough to guarantee a 
certain evaporation rate. This solution foresees a lay-out where the pool 
should be characterized by a water level higher than the required. A well-
defined level variation, due to the evaporation rate, has to be allowed (Figure 
20) and compensated each time the level decreases under a preselected 
value (minimum level that allows the system to guarantee the required safety 
function). In any case, also when the pool reaches its minimum level it has to 
guarantee a water inventory higher than the required. A second possible 
solution is to increase the water inventory, coupling the standard pool with an 
additional volume that has to be foreseen underground (Figure 21). This 
solution allows to reduce the surface-volume ratio and hence the evaporation 
rate. 
 Low temperature environment: 
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The passive check valve, completely closed during the normal operating 
conditions, can be coupled with a small by-pass equipped with a control valve. 
In this solution, thanks to an active system, the by-pass flow rate can be easily 
controlled in order to avoid the freezing of the pool (Figure 22). ). In this 
condition, the solution leads to thermal losses that will reduce the overall 
efficiency, even if this reduction is quite limited and results to be much lower 
than one per cent. 
 
Figure 20. Design solution allowing a certain evaporation rate 
Safety Systems Suitable for any Nuclear Reactors, Especially for SMRs 
73 
 
 
Figure 21. Design solution with an underground additional water inventory 
 
 
Figure 22. By-pass solution to maintain the water inventory in liquid state 
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The requirements of 72 hours without any external intervention can be easily 
achieved with this system; the 72 hours may be reduced to any value. The features 
and flexibility of the system allow designers to select the air-only heat sink delay 
occurrence at any desirable value. They make the innovative system especially 
attractive for applications on small/medium sized nuclear reactors. After a limited 
period of time it is sufficient to remove a decay heat of about 1% of the reactor rated 
power15. In a small/medium reactor, this value results low enough to be completely 
removed through an air-only heat sink, designing the heat exchanger with very 
limited dimensions. Such a system can be applied also on chemical power plants 
where, if a thermal runaway reaction occurs, it can be passively controlled removing 
the heat and the plant can be brought again in a safe condition. 
The overall main advantages achievable with this system are: 
 A high heat capacity due to the large water inventory and a good heat transfer 
coefficient when the pool is filled with subcooled water; 
 Excellent decay heat removal capability after the first transient period following 
the reactor shutdown; the very high heat transfer coefficient of pool boiling 
water limits the upstream temperatures and allows a good heat removal; 
 Long term operability without any external intervention, thanks to the 
automatic shift from the water heat sink to the air-only heat sink, passing 
through a mixed solution that includes air and boiling water at the same time; 
 Compact heat exchanger, because the air-only heat sink takes the place of 
the water heat sink when a very limited power has to be removed (the power 
percentage to be removed by the air-only heat sink can be easily defined by 
the designer but some hundreds kW should be a good compromise with 
limited rated power of the NPP); 
 Possibility to delay the occurrence of the air-only heat sink simply increasing 
the water inventory initially present in the pool (the empty volume side can be 
enlarged as desired). 
 
                                            
15 In a standard PWR a decay heat power equal to the 1% of the design thermal power is reached 
between 2 and 5 hours after the shutdown. 
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4.6 Patent application 
The several advantages so far analyzed and the innovation characterizing this 
solution led to apply it for a patent as an “industrial invention”. 
At the present time, systems aimed at passively removing the decay heat are 
generally based on water, but only a limited amount of it would be available, or on air, 
but very large sized heat exchangers would be required. Moreover, the passive 
check valve, responsible to passively activate the system, has not been studied and 
a solution as the MARS one was hypothesized, but it is beyond the present invention 
(see paragraph 4.1). 
The possibility to extend the patent of  the system in some specific country is under 
consideration, and further development of the system can be considered in order to 
apply it to different specific cases. 
Presently, the patent application has been submitted to the Italian patent office and 
then also to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to have the 
possibility of publishing it also in other countries. The first page of the international 
patent application (n° WO 2012/063209 A2) extracted from the original document is 
reported in the Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. First page of the PCT patent application 
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5 SAFETY SYSTEMS APPLICABLE TO 
DIFFERENT NUCLEAR REACTORS TYPES 
(SFRS AND LFRS) 
In the present chapter, two innovative components especially suitable for liquid metal 
cooled reactors are presented and their innovative features are also analyzed. Both 
systems are aimed at removing heat from the primary coolant, but the former system is 
aimed at the steam production for the thermal cycle, while the latter is especially aimed at 
removing the decay heat. Both of them are characterized by very improved safety features 
and they are especially aimed at avoiding any contact between the primary coolant (i.e. 
sodium, lead or lead-bismuth eutectic) and the heat transfer fluid used to connect the 
system to the final heat sink (i.e. water or diathermic oil). The system whose target is the 
steam production is called CANDLE (see paragraph 5.1), while the system aimed at the 
decay heat removal form Liquid Metal cooled Fast Reactors is called radiation-based DHX 
(see paragraph 5.3). 
 
5.1 Paper on the Candle concept 
Journal: International Journal of Risk Theory 
Year: 2011 
Volume: 1 
Pages: 23 - 44 
Title: A Proposal for Simplification and Cost Reduction of SFRs 
Authors: A. Naviglio, D. Vitale Di Maio, F. Giannetti, G. Caruso, G. D’Amico 
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Abstract: 
The present work is aimed at describing an innovative plant solution able to greatly simplify and 
to make a fast neutron Sodium cooled nuclear reactor plant cheaper, without impairing safety. 
An innovative system has been developed, aimed at eliminating the intermediate sodium loop. It 
is based on a special heat exchanger that “joins” the intermediate heat exchanger, typical SFRs 
component, to the steam generator. The presence of an intermediate loop in Sodium Fast 
Reactors (SFR) is due to the high reactivity features of sodium with air or water. Thanks to this 
circuit a reaction between primary sodium (radioactive) and water/steam, within the energy 
conversion system, is prevented and, at the same time, the following presence of reaction 
product in the primary circuit, with the safety implication it would have, is avoided. Moreover, the 
plant solution proposed allows to maintain a physical double separation between primary 
sodium and water/steam, but avoiding any moving component within the fluid between primary 
sodium and water/steam. 
 
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s 
Seventh R&TD Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2011) under grant agreement n° 232658. 
 
Introduction on Sodium Fast Reactors (SFRs) 
Key aspects of SFRs relevant for the new design 
Selection of sodium in Nuclear Power Plants 
The use of Sodium in a Fast Neutron Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is linked with several 
aspects that have to be considered. Sodium is characterized by special features that make 
it very attractive to be used for removal of thermal power produced within the core of a 
nuclear reactor: 
 An excellent thermal conductivity of liquid sodium implies a very high heat transfer 
capability even at modest liquid velocities (high power density in fuel is possible); 
 A high volumetric expansion coefficient of liquid sodium, that is useful to reach the 
condition of natural circulation of the coolant with modest temperature difference 
(coolability of fuel is easier to be achieved in accidental conditions); 
 A high boiling temperature at low pressure allows a high energy conversion 
efficiency at quite low operation pressures. 
At the same time, sodium physical-chemical characteristics have also negative effects: 
 An excellent thermal conductivity has thermal-mechanical implications in fast 
temperature variations (thermal shock risks); 
 A limited heat capacity implies higher temperature difference between inlet and 
outlet for given power and flow; 
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 A melting point at operating pressure (near atmospheric) higher than the room 
temperature requires a special heating system in order to avoid coolant freezing;  
 A high chemical reactivity of sodium with air and water strongly affects safety and 
therefore has several implications on plant system and component design, as well 
as on plant operation and maintenance activities and costs. 
 
SFRs schemes 
Solutions adopted in design of nuclear reactor systems using sodium as primary coolant, 
have always been aimed at preventing any possible contact between the primary coolant 
(active sodium) and the energy conversion fluid (water), as well as between active sodium 
and the environment. Usually, three independent circuits have been used to reach this 
purpose: the active primary coolant flows within the first loop including the nuclear reactor 
and an intermediate heat exchanger (IHX); the secondary coolant (sodium) flows within an 
intermediate loop including the secondary side of the IHX and the primary side of steam 
generators (SG) where the working fluid (water) vaporizes and is super-heated before 
reaching the steam turbine. 
 
Fig. 1. Scheme of a classical solution for SFRs 
 
The intermediate loop is necessary to prevent a possible interaction between the primary 
active sodium and high pressure water/steam in case of a separating barrier failure: 
sodium-water reaction products and water itself would enter into the primary coolant 
boundary, destructive phenomena could occur owing to the high energy generation due to 
water/sodium reaction, with possible release of radioactivity in the reactor building.  
Components of the primary circuit are generally arranged according to two different 
schemes: 
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 loop solution, characterized by: 
- limited primary vessel size and primary sodium amount in it; 
- pumps and intermediate heat exchanger easy to maintain; 
- long piping extension and large number of connections; 
- on the whole, it is not a compact solution. 
 pool solution: 
- compactness of the whole system; 
- primary sodium presence only within the primary tank; 
- system easy to fill and drain; 
- higher thermal inertia due to the larger amount of primary sodium in the 
reactor tank; 
- particles within sodium may be deposited in low speed zones. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Scheme of a pool type Sodium Fast Reactor 
 
Safety systems applicable to different nuclear reactors types (SFRs and LFRs) 
81 
 
 
Fig. 3. Scheme of a loop type Sodium Fast Reactor 
 
Schemes of three typical SFRs projects (Superphénix, Monju, BN 600) 
Different countries have chosen different solutions and reactors of both types have been 
built. Three reactors are briefly analyzed below and their main characteristics are reported 
in the table. 
 
Tab. 1. Characteristics of three SFRs 
Reactor  
(country) 
Reactor 
power MWth 
(MWe) 
First 
criticalit
y 
Final 
shut-
down 
Operation
al 
period 
(years) 
Superphéni
x 
(France) 
3000  
(1240) 
1985 1997 12 
 
BN-600  
(Russia) 
1470  
(600) 
1980 (2020) 31 
MONJU  
(Japan) 
714 
(280) 
1994 - 17 
 
Superphénix 
The Superphénix NPP was based on a reactor that has been operating in France up to 
1997. It was characterized by a pool configuration and each circuit (primary, secondary 
and tertiary) was made up of 4 parallel loops. The whole system included 4 SGs, 4 primary 
pumps and 8 IHXs. The primary sodium (about 2500 tons) flowed through the core 
between 395 °C and 545 °C. The primary sodium flowed within the shell side of the IHX 
Safety systems applicable to different nuclear reactors types (SFRs and LFRs) 
82 
 
where it released heat to the secondary sodium. Thanks to once-through SGs, steam at 
487°C and 177 bar was produced. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Scheme of the Superphénix reactor 
 
BN-600 
The BN-600 reactor is a pool type, it was built in Russia, and it is still operative. Each 
circuit of the system (primary, secondary and tertiary) is characterized by 3 parallel loops. 
Primary sodium flows through the core, passing from 365 °C to 535 °C before reaching the 
IHX where the secondary sodium reaches 510 °C and produces steam at 500 °C and 132 
bar. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Scheme of the BN-600 reactor 
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Monju 
Unlike the previously described solutions, the Monju reactor is a loop type, choice mainly 
due to seismic considerations, for easier accessibility of the components and to use the 
experience gained with the experimental reactor Joyo. The reactor was built in Japan and 
is still in operation. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Scheme of the Monju reactor 
 
Main aspects concerning Sodium as coolant 
In order to design a NPP with sodium as primary coolant, the high chemical reactivity, the 
incompressibility of liquid sodium as well as the high thermal expansion coefficient have to 
be taken into account. The system foresees an inert argon volume to cover free sodium 
surfaces to prevent exothermic reactions between sodium and air/water. At the same time 
the free sodium level within the component, with argon above, is used for expansion 
purposes. The system components and pipes are traced with electrical heaters to always 
maintain sodium in liquid state. The main problems connected with the use of sodium as 
coolant are analyzed in the following sections. 
 
Sodium–water reactions 
The main problem is due to the highly exothermic reaction between sodium and water 
(SWR)16. Sodium reacts with water/steam generating sodium hydroxide, hydrogen and 
heat accordingly with equation [1]: 
                                            
16 The SWR is a complex process where reactions take place in two different steps. Concerning safety 
analysis, the first step of reaction is the most  important one  because it generates heat, hydrogen and rapid 
pressure increase:  
1. The first step is characterized by a high rate and release of gaseous hydrogen and heat: 
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2 2
1 140
2
kJNa H O NaOH H
mol
+ → + +  
The reactions between sodium and water/steam have major implications in the design, 
material selection and protection system of sodium-heated SGs. These components are 
the most critical ones for successful operation of a sodium cooled fast reactor power plant. 
The implications in the SG design that have to be taken into account are high 
temperatures at reaction front, failure propagation to adjacent tubes, material erosion and 
high pressure within the sodium side of the SG. This reaction occurred several times 
during the operation of some reactors; some examples are reported below: 
 Phénix: 30 kg of water injected within the sodium bulk. 
 PFR: failure of a superheater tube due to bundle vibrations.  
 BN 350 and BN 600: the worst event took place in January 1981, with 40 kg of 
water injected within the sodium. 
The lessons learned from these accidents are: 
1. In terms of protection: 
- need of high reliability and rapidity of the hydrogen detection system; 
- automatic shutdown accompanied by rapid depressurization on the steam 
side; 
- modularization on design of a casing around the SG, capable of confining 
even the most violent SWR; 
- existence of safety membranes to limit any pressure increase. 
2. In terms of prevention: 
- better thermo-mechanical design; 
- more suitable materials; 
- extreme quality in manufacturing (100% inspection, non-extended welds, 
etc.); 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 2
1 140
2
kJNa H O NaOH H
mol
+ → + +  
2. The second step is characterized by the reaction of products of the first step and additional 
sodium, according to these equations: 
2
2
2
1
2
Na NaOH Na O NaH
Na H NaH
+ → +
+ →
 
 Then, the total reaction may be represented as:  
2 24 2Na H O NaH Na O+ → +  
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- precautions in use (prevention of spurious thermal shocks, circuit well 
protected during drainages, etc.). 
Superphénix did not have any SWR: nevertheless, the short reactor lifetime did not allow 
to validate the SG solution. Several minor problems were verified in plant operation and 
maintenance. Since 1991, the BN-600 and BN-350 reactors have had no further SWRs. 
 
Sodium–air reactions 
Liquid sodium reacts with air and oxidation reaction can occur in a runaway manner, 
leading to sodium fire [2]: 
2 2 2
2 2
2 519
12 435
2
kJNa O Na O
mol
kJNa O Na O
mol
+ → +
+ → +
 
The ignition temperature of sodium is 220°C in damp air, 200°C in dry air and as low as 
120°C in stirred liquid pool. Sodium burning is accompanied by production of dense 
sodium oxide fumes even if the produced heat is much less than conventional 
hydrocarbon fires. The system must be leak-tight to prevent sodium leaks. The 
piping/components must be equipped with leak-detection devices in order to limit the 
effects of fire.  
Sodium leaks 
Concerning the core cooling and integrity, primary coolant leaks are less hazardous in 
SFRs than in others reactors, because sodium is only slightly pressurized. Anyway, 
several sodium leaks took place on reactors, sometimes leading to sodium fires. The most 
serious sodium leak occurred at Monju (approximately 640 kg of Na) which resulted in 
reactor shutdown during more than 12 years. The leaks’ amounts are very different, from 
less than one gram (detected during inspection) to massive events (BN-600, 2 leaks 
greater than 300 kg and one involving 1000 kg). 
These sodium leaks can have very different origins: 
 Construction defects or problems due to design; 
 Material problems, such as 321 steel stress cracking; 
 Thermal crazing leading to through cracks;  
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 Corrosion following air intake into the circuits; 
 Operator error (for example, during thawing of the circuit and the corresponding 
expansion of the sodium). 
Lessons have been learnt from these incidents in terms of design, circuit operating 
procedures, leak detection and protection from sodium fires. 
The two latter points have led to the following: 
 Diversified, redundant detection instrumentation ; 
 Need for rapid drainage of sodium circuits; 
 Sectoring around the sodium areas to limit the quantity of air available in the event 
of a possible fire; 
 Insulation protection of the concrete floors and walls, covered with a metal plate; 
 Possibility of inert gas blanketing of the areas involved. 
Cost aspects and Generation IV requirements 
The Generation IV reactors are designed according to stringent specifications, in particular 
regarding sustainability, economics, safety and reliability, proliferation resistance and 
physical protection. Most of the designs under development are generally not expected to 
be available for commercial construction before 2030. The GIF (Generation IV 
International Forum) provided the criteria for identifying and selecting six nuclear energy 
systems to further develop. Some of these criteria, especially those related with economic 
and safety aspects, are summarized below [3]: 
 
“[…]  
Economics: Generation IV nuclear energy systems will have a clear life-cycle cost advantage over 
other energy sources. 
Economics: Generation IV nuclear energy systems will have a level of financial risk comparable to 
other energy projects. 
Safety and Reliability: Generation IV nuclear energy system operations will excel in safety and 
reliability. 
Safety and Reliability: Generation IV nuclear energy systems will have a very low likelihood and 
degree of reactor core damage. 
Safety and Reliability: Generation IV nuclear energy systems will eliminate the need for offsite 
emergency response. 
[…]” 
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The "Candle" concept: Intermediate Sodium loop not 
necessary 
Core cooling in a nuclear reactor is the most important function of the whole power plant, 
together with a safe shutdown. Since a small interference in the core cooling could lead to 
a significant drifting in the reactor behavior, the primary coolant must operate under very 
well-known and controlled conditions (i.e. high purity, no coolant path obstructions, no 
cavitation phenomena, etc.).  
In SFRs, a risk linked to the possibility that a SWR occurs and reaction products can 
circulate within the primary loop exists. Since a water/steam tube rupture can lead to a 
chemical exothermic reaction and the products are explosive (H2), caustic and corrosive 
(NaOH), and can obstruct the fuel sub-channels within the core, prevention of any 
contamination of the primary coolant is of primary importance. For this purpose, as already 
anticipated in the paper, an intermediate circuit, between primary sodium and the tertiary 
circuit (water/steam as working fluid), is always adopted. 
The use of an intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) in plant solutions already built implies the 
presence of another hydraulic loop (possibly, multiple), which complicates the overall 
design, increases the plant costs and adds other maintenance issues; thus its elimination, 
or drastic simplification, would be extremely advantageous from the standpoint of 
efficiency, costs and safety. 
The innovative solution, here presented and called “candle”, is based on a double barrier 
separation between the water and the primary sodium, replacing the conventional 
intermediate sodium loop with a simple heat transfer system, working in absence of 
moving fluids. Thanks to this solution all the secondary sodium auxiliary systems (pumps, 
valves, dump vessels, etc.) are no longer necessary. The merging of the IHX with the SG 
allows achieving all the above mentioned objectives concerning reliability, economics and 
safety. 
Introduction on the "Candle" concept 
The candle is the key-component of the proposed innovation in SFR design; it has been 
foreseen with a very simple configuration, as shown below (Fig. 7).  
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Fig. 7. The “Candle” concept and its working scheme 
 
The candle consists of a small diameter vessel, containing three “U-bend” tubes (arranged 
in angles of 120°); the straight vessel has an easy–to-manufacture geometry and it 
presents no irregularity, while the inner tubes are foreseen with a relatively large U-bend, 
in order to achieve a relevant manufacturing easiness, and to have very low stresses. The 
structural material for the vessel and the tubes is assumed to be stainless steel (having a 
high corrosion resistance with sodium and mechanical strength). The candle is submerged 
in primary sodium, and it is filled with a coupling fluid, which thermally connects the 
primary sodium and the water flowing within the tubes. 
The primary sodium, outside the candle vessel, flows downward transferring heat. The 
filling fluid has been chosen taking into account its thermal-physical properties since it has 
the purpose of transferring heat from the core coolant (primary sodium) to the working fluid 
(water) mainly by conduction. In the reference case, sodium has been chosen as filling 
fluid. 
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Advantages of the concept and critical points to focus 
Thanks to the innovative proposed concept, the overall NSSS size is greatly reduced. In 
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, it can be seen that the presence of the candle inside the system greatly 
reduces the number of components and systems required, especially avoiding any moving 
part within the secondary circuit. 
 
 
Fig. 8. The pool and loop standard concept schemes (secondary circuits in red) 
 
 
Fig. 9. The “Candle” concept scheme (secondary circuit in red) 
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The presence of the candles implies also simpler construction processes. Such an 
innovative solution requires a dedicated safety analysis to verify the feasibility of the 
system. In particular, the heat exchanger characteristics and the problems due to the 
presence of impurities (eventually, generated from a sodium water interaction) in the 
primary coolant should be verified in the reference accident conditions to assure that: 
 No consequences derive from the interaction of primary sodium and secondary 
stagnant coolant;  
 The failure of a water/steam tube and the consequent interaction between 
secondary stagnant coolant and the working fluid do not compromise the integrity of 
adjacent tubes within the same candle; 
 The failure of a tube and the consequent interaction between secondary stagnant 
coolant and the working fluid do not compromise the integrity of candle vessel, in 
order to prevent any possible interaction between water and primary sodium and 
the possibility that reaction products reach the primary circuit and hence the core. 
 
Engineering aspects of the proposed design for the Candle 
Design criteria 
“U” tubes radius selection 
The selection of the “U” tubes bend radius, within the candle vessel, is a key parameter 
since it affects the manufacturing costs of the steam generator and, indirectly, the minimal 
candle vessel diameter. The radius is a function of the tube thickness and diameter that 
were selected as follows: 
 Tube thickness to withstand the pressure difference between the working fluid 
(about 185 bar) and the secondary stagnant fluid (about 3 bar). Conservative 
evaluation implied atmosphere pressure as reference pressure instead of the real 
operating pressure; 
 Tube internal diameter to maintain the water/steam velocity lower than defined 
values having acceptable heat transfer coefficient. In any case the minimization of 
the total number of the candles within the system has to be considered as one of 
main targets. 
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The selection of the “U” tube radius affects the candle vessel diameter and generally an 
iterative process is required in order to define the optimum “U” tube diameter, the “U” tube 
bend radius and hence the candle vessel diameter. 
 
Candle diameter selection 
The choice of the candle vessel diameter has to be made taking into account the following 
issues: 
Minimization of the overall Candle dimensions; 
Costs minimization: 
 Use of standard commercial pipe for vessel and tubes for “U” tubes; 
 Candle vessel diameter large enough to allow a sufficient space to have a 180° “U” 
tube bend with a standard radius and easy manufacturing processes; 
 Diameter large enough to have a sufficient heat transfer surface from primary 
sodium to the stagnant secondary coolant; 
 Diameter large enough to allow an easy discharge of the stagnant secondary 
sodium (if any) in case of a sodium water reaction (failure of a tube), in order to 
minimize the severity of the pressure transient; 
 Diameter small enough to minimize the stagnant sodium thermal resistance. 
 
Taking into account these issues, a diameter of 0.1 m was selected in correspondence to 
a ¾” BWG 13 tube selected as reference for the “U” tubes. 
 
Finned/not finned 
In order to enhance the heat transfer performance of the steam generator, or to reduce the 
tube length with other parameters being equal, fins can be added in the riser tubes 
section. The presence of finned tubes could improve the heat transfer capability of the 
system but is strongly affected by the filling fluid choice in addition to the type and material 
of fins. In fact, if the thermal conductivity of the filling fluid, in which heat transfer is mainly 
based on conduction, is higher than that of the fins material, a solution based on not finned 
tubes is preferable. 
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Heat transfer enhancement 
A common issue related with once-through steam generators is the strong reduction of the 
heat transfer capability of the system in the post dry-out region. The dry-out corresponds 
to the point in which the drying of the inner wall of the tube occurs and the heat transfer 
coefficient decreases because of the steam presence against the tube wall. 
Once the post dry-out condition is reached, the complete vaporization of the droplets 
entrained into the steam flow becomes more difficult because specific power decreases, 
due to heat transfer occurring basically with a vapor phase. Since this issue strongly 
penalizes the heat transfer performance of the steam generator, and the dimensions of the 
candles, possible solutions have been investigated in order to minimize this effect. Each 
solution analyzed has been evaluated to verify: first, the feasibility and secondly, possible 
contras that can affect the whole system. Among the analyzed systems, taking into 
account problems related to the manufacturing complication of the candle and to the 
increase of total pressure drop within the system, the choice has regarded a special use of 
a standard heat transfer enhancement device; in particular, the chosen device was a 
“twisted tape”. 
Twisted tapes are usually used in single-phase zones, where the helical flow allows to 
locally increase the velocity and hence the heat transfer coefficient. The special use within 
the candle system concerns the use of the turbulence enhancement system from the dry-
out point up to the outlet section, achieving two benefits: 
1. Within the post dry-out zone (liquid deficient zone), thanks to the centrifugal force, 
the droplets entrained into the steam flow are forced outward against the tube wall 
and immediately vaporize guaranteeing a high heat transfer coefficient also within 
the liquid deficient zone. The heat transfer coefficient, since the liquid droplets are 
in saturation condition, results as high as in the nucleate boiling and the droplets 
can completely vaporize in a very short length.  
2. Since the post dry-out region is reduced by the inclusion of the twisted-tape, the 
superheating zone is longer for a same tube length. Moreover, thanks to the 
presence of the twisted-tape, an average increase of about 1.5 times in the heat 
transfer coefficient is expected. 
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Fig. 10. Scheme and main parameters of a twisted tape insert 
 
 
Obviously, it is of primary importance the definition of the dry-out point from where the 
twisted tape has to be foreseen. In fact, the presence of twisted tape within the tube 
causes an increase in pressure drops especially concerning the two-phase region.  
The optimum, from an engineering point of view, is that the twisted tape starts from the 
dry-out point and arrives up to the outlet section (see Fig. 11). 
Since the heat transfer coefficient, in the post dry-out region, falls down, an evaluation of 
the improvement in the heat transfer coefficient due to the twisted tape insertion has been 
carried out (see Fig. 12).  
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Fig. 11. Scheme of the candle concept with the insertion of a twisted tape above the dry-out point. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Evaluation of the heat transfer coefficient trend as a function of the “U” tube length 
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Insulator length 
The candle heat exchanger consists of "U" tubes and, within the preheating section, the 
working fluid flows downward against the natural circulation direction. To maintain at 
acceptable values the density difference between the inlet section and the lower section of 
the “U” tube, the saturation condition of the working fluid has to be avoided.  In order to 
prevent reaching the saturation point within the downcomer, an insulating layer aimed at 
limiting the heat transfer from primary sodium (through the stagnant fluid) to the working 
fluid has been foreseen around the downcomer tube.  In order to optimize the performance 
of the heat exchanger, the length of the insulator has to be long enough to cause 
saturation condition of the working fluid in the bottom part of the riser section in order to 
support natural circulation. 
Choice of filling fluid 
In order to choose the best filling fluid for the secondary stagnant coolant, a comparison 
among different liquid metals has been performed. For each material, pros and contras 
have been compared in order to evaluate the best solution for the filling fluid. In particular, 
the comparison has been based on costs, chemical and physical risks, thermal-physical 
properties, etc. This analysis considered Sodium, Lead, Gallium and Indium. 
Trying to find a compromise between the overall system performance and its reliability, 
taking into account safety aspects and issues concerning the corrosiveness of alternative 
liquid metals selected, the most appropriate filling fluid has been considered sodium. 
For the candle, a filling fluid characterized by a high thermal conductivity is necessary, in 
order to reduce thermal losses within the candle and to minimize the number of required 
candles. From the safety point of view, an intermediate fluid equal to the primary coolant is 
a huge advantage: in case of an integrity failure of the candle vessel two identical fluids 
will be put in contact without any consequence for the plant safety. Moreover, sodium is a 
relatively light metal and this is an advantage both concerning structural solutions (also 
taking into account abnormal design loads as seismic ones) and for candle draining 
process. 
The choice of the filling fluid has fallen on sodium, mainly for three reasons: 
 The high thermal conductivity allows to have high heat transfer coefficient even in 
stagnation conditions, where the heat transfer capability of the system is mainly 
based on conduction. 
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 The low density value of sodium implies smaller structure compared with alternative 
filling fluids analyzed and hence lower costs. 
 Chemical behavior of fluids and criticality in material selection. 
 
In-sight on safety of a Candle-based integrated IHX/SG 
The Candle resistance  
Preliminary studies have been carried out in order to identify the minimum candle vessel 
thickness to withstand loads in accident conditions, when a sodium water reaction occurs. 
The rough evaluation showed that the pressure transient following the SWR occurrence is 
strongly influenced by the time required for sodium removal from the candle volume. At 
present, detailed CFD analyses are being carried out in order to obtain a detailed pressure 
and temperature transient during the accident evolution. The pressure difference existing 
between the filling fluid and the working fluid implies the critical flow condition that limits 
the water mass flow rate and hence the quantity of water that can react with sodium per 
unit time. The safety margins related with maximum values of pressure and temperature 
can lead to modify the candle vessel diameter in order to reduce the required time to 
eliminate sodium form the candle volume. 
The need not to involve surrounding Candles 
If a water tube rupture occurs within a candle, or if a water leakage from the distribution 
system occurs, the water could flow, from the SG upper volume, inside the candle vessel. 
With the purpose of avoiding, or at least minimizing, any water intake into the stagnant 
sodium, each candle is provided with a plug characterized by the following features: 
 it must eliminate or limit the water/steam flow from the volume above the candle 
itself (dome); 
 it must prevent the candle pressurization, in case of internal SWR, so it has to 
operate as a rupture disc; 
 it must allow the differential thermal expansion of the hot and cold legs of the “U” 
tubes within the candle; 
 it must provide a way to fill and drain the candle with sodium. 
For this purpose, an idea has been developed (see Fig. 13) where: 
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 the axial labyrinth seal provides a barrier against external steam/water inlet, but 
allows the differential thermal expansion of the U-tube legs; 
 the central rupture disc will break in case of a limited candle pressurization, but it 
can be removed in order to allow access to the filling sodium (for purging/filling 
operations, as well as for ISI&R purposes) 
 
 
Fig. 13. The candle vessel plug and scheme of the rupture disc 
 
Engineering of the tanks hosting the Candles 
The support of piping in the Candles 
Important issues linked with thermal expansion phenomena must be taken into account. 
The cold leg of the “U” tube, the downcomer, is totally filled with subcooled water, while the 
hot leg, riser, is filled with saturated water and superheated steam at the same pressure. 
For this reason, the mean temperatures between the two sides of the “U” tube are very 
different. Due to the height of the water tube (more than 15 m), a significant length 
increase, due to thermal expansion of the steel, is expected. A rough calculation has been 
carried out, leading to the following results: 
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The result shows a considerable differential thermal length increase, which should be 
taken into account in a further stage of design, for example, implementing a device based 
on a flexible support as that shown in Fig. 14. 
 
Fig. 14. Schematic representation of the flexible support that allows free thermal expansion of the “U” tubes 
The grouping of candles into modules 
The whole steam supply system is made up of several candles and it is impossible to 
move each candle separately. Moreover, the very high aspect ratio (H/D) of the candle 
implies low structural strength. In order to take into account all these aspects and to make 
the construction easier, 36 candles are grouped within a single module (see Fig. 15). This 
solution thus reduces time and costs required for manufacturing of the system, responding 
at the economic requirements for generation IV reactors. 
 
Fig. 15. Single module made up of 36 candles 
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The dome 
Since the required candles are a lot, they are arranged within special tanks outside the 
primary tank (the NPP configuration becomes a mixing between the “pool” and the “loop” 
concepts). Each SG tank will be enclosed, in the upper part, in a metallic dome, which has 
a double goal: 
 it must contain sodium/water leakage from the circuits (avoiding any environment 
contamination), and it must be able to withstand the reference accidental conditions 
 the pump supporting structure can be placed within such volume. 
The volume within the dome must be filled with an inert gas, in order to prevent any  air-
sodium interactions (sodium fires). In this study, argon has been assumed as cover gas. 
The coupling of the dome with the cylindrical vessel can be realized, for example, with a 
flange along the full perimeter. Since the upper volume of the tank holds the sodium 
distribution piping, the inner diameter (15 m) is sized taking into account the dimensions of 
the tubes (in particular the hot ones). 
 
Fig. 16. Representation of the dome above one of the candle tanks 
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Fig. 17. Structural details of the dome and of sodium distribution piping within it 
 
A preliminary evaluation of the necessary free volume within the dome has been carried 
out and later verified. Two independent evaluations of the dome pressurization due to the 
release of a high pressure water flow within a candle have been carried out (1. 
RELAP5/mod3.3; 2. Computer code developed ad hoc). This preliminary evaluation did 
not take into account the thermal heat produced within the candle due to the sodium-water 
reaction. The simulation does not result conservative but it can give a rough indication of 
the pressure equilibrium value at the end of the accident transient phase. Since the 
pressure transient has been evaluated to be very short (less than 1 second), the pressure 
value that affects the structural design of the dome is mainly due to the high pressure of 
the water/steam circuit; while concerning the structural design of the candle, it could be 
mainly influenced by the temperature and pressure values following the SWR.  
The results of the simplified simulation concerning the failure a “U” tube within the candle, 
in terms of final pressure and temperature in the dome volume, are reported below: 
Tab. 2. RELAP 5 DBA simulation results 
Dome final conditions 
Vapor pressure Total pressure Temperature 
0.535 bar 1.857 bar 280.1 °C 
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The main consequences of the reference accident condition on the structures are reported 
below: 
 
 The temperature increase (+18 °C), within the dome, involves steel yield stress 
decreasing of about 2.4%, while the ultimate stress will remain almost constant (–
0.15%); 
 The dome volume pressure increment (+48.8%) causes an increase of the 
mechanical stress of the dome wall; 
 The pressure rising within the dome volume causes a linear increase in the load 
carried by the plate itself. 
 
Results show that the effects of this accident are acceptable. Nevertheless, should more 
than one candle be involved in the accident, the amount of released energy could be too 
high. Thinking to this case, it is advisable to provide a relief tank in order to increase the 
total volume available for gas expansion. 
 
The mechanical support of candles and thermal protection 
Due to the severe conditions in which the candle steam generators have to work, special 
solutions have to be provided in order to guarantee the integrity of all structures and not to 
reach extreme conditions (temperature and pressure values). In particular, in order to 
avoid any reduction of the mechanical resistance of the support plate, where the weight of 
the candle modules is borne, an intermediate plate, without any structural function, 
between the free sodium level and the support plate has been foreseen. In this way, the 
support plate operates at a lower temperature and higher mechanical performance is 
guaranteed. 
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Fig. 18. Scheme of the internal support structure within a candle tank 
 
Seismic candle protection 
Due to the considerable length of the candles and to the presence of only upper 
mechanical constrains, in case of a seismic event candles could move horizontally causing 
possible candle vessel failure. In order to minimize the free horizontal movement of each 
candle, a series of lateral support plates has been foreseen, within the height of the 
candles, of the types shown below (see Fig. 19). 
 
Fig. 19. Detail of a lateral support plate for the candle modules 
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The Balance of Plant 
Piping lay-out 
In order to produce electricity, the steam has to be sent to a turbine and a suitable piping 
system is required. Due to the high number of candles and tubes (reminding that each 
candle is characterized by three feedwater inlet and three steam line outlet), a complex 
system of manifolds and pipes has been studied.  During the development of the piping 
system of water and steam, a preliminary solution was selected; later, with the target of 
cost minimization, an alternative solution, based on standard components only, has been 
developed.  
Since the first solution analyzed would require non-standard components, in spite of the 
possibility of lower diameter for the candle tank, an increase in costs would be 
experienced. Taking into account a solution described before (grouping several candles in 
a single module) and the use of standard components only, an alternative manifold 
solution has been identified. Each candle module is includes 36 candles arranged on 6 
parallel rows; each row can have an independent manifold concerning both the feedwater 
and the steam. This solution strongly simplifies the piping management since pipes with 
lower diameter can be used and also within a single module there are independent sub-
systems made up of 6 candles that contribute to the complete modularization of the steam 
supply system.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 20. Schemes of a sub-system made up of 6 candles within a module of 36 candles and the schematic representation 
of piping connections to the main manifolds. 
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Cost considerations 
Rough evaluation, based on weights of machined steel in SPX2 and on 
the Candle-based-SFR weights 
The investment cost, due to the realization of the proposed Candle SG, is an essential 
parameter for its feasibility evaluation. At the present phase, detailed characteristics are 
not yet available, and no provision has been made yet on the realization phases of all the 
components necessary for a full integration in a nuclear power plant (i.e. concrete vault, 
instrumentation, safety cooling systems, dedicated radiological shielding for devices 
operating in radioactive environment, etc.). Therefore, at present only a very rough 
evaluation is possible for cost assessment, taking into account only the material cost. A 
preliminary whole evaluation of the steam generator system cost has been performed. As 
result of this evaluation, the comprehensive cost of a single tank including its internal 
components (candles, “U” tubes, piping, manifolds, valves, etc.), in a solution made up of 
three heat exchanger tanks, should be in a range between 40 and 50 M€. Concerning the 
manufacturing costs, a percentage close to 50% of the whole cost could be assumed. 
 
Conclusions 
Studies carried out during the last years showed some very attractive features concerning 
the concept of the “Candle”-type steam generator for application in SFRs, especially in 
view at the elimination of the intermediate sodium circuit, through the “fusion” of the 
traditional IHX with the SG. The elimination of the intermediate sodium circuit, together 
with its components, results in a great saving in capital cost as well as in a reduction of 
component number and in ISI&R strategies simplification. 
In spite of the great simplification due to the introduction of this system, the safety 
performance of the NPP are not compromised, but even improved.  
In case of a possible double wall failure, of “U” tubes and of the candle vessel, since the 
SWR occurs outside the primary tank, only the reaction products can affect the operation 
of the reactor rather than the pressure transient too. Isolation valves on the sodium piping 
could, in any case, avoid also this remote problem. 
Concerning the development of the innovative system to a more advanced stage, further 
studies should be performed in order to: 
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 Optimize the candle geometry according to results obtained in the safety analyses 
(possibility to increase the candle diameter to reduce the required draining time, 
evaluation of exact volume and other dimensions of the tank dome, etc.); 
 Carefully evaluate the costs of the whole system manufacturing, in order to 
compare this solution with the alternative ones within the scope of GEN IV 
economics requirements. 
 
Nomenclature 
GIF  Generation IV International Forum 
IHX  Intermediate Heat eXchanger 
ISI&R  In Service Inspection and Repair 
NPP  Nuclear Power Plant 
SFR  Sodium Fast Reactor 
SWR  Sodium Water Reaction 
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5.2 Further consideration on the Candle solution 
5.2.1 Filling fluid selection 
Different filling fluids have been investigated but, for different reasons, sodium has been 
selected also as filling fluid. This choice has been mainly due its thermal properties, 
despite its high chemical reactivity causes many drawbacks. In the Tab. 3 some 
characteristics of filling fluids analyzed and compared for the same purpose are reported. 
Tab. 3. Some relevant parameters of three filling fluids analyzed 
  Sodium Lead Gallium 
Thermal 
conductivity 
(@m.p.) 
[ W | m K ] 89 15.8 28.22 
Density 
(@m.p.) 
[ kg | m3 ] 927 10650 6116 
Melting point [ °C ] 97.72 327.46 29.76 
 
The data are obtained from correlations available in literature ([8], [9] and [10]). 
Since the thermal coupling between the primary sodium and the working fluid is obtained 
by means of a stagnant filling fluid, the thermal conductivity is one of the most important 
parameters affecting the heat transfer performance of the whole system. 
The choice to use sodium as filling fluid has been mainly due to the following 
considerations: 
 The liquid Sodium has a higher thermal conductivity compared with Lead and 
Gallium; 
 Since each candle vessel is submerged in the primary sodium, using sodium as 
filling fluid allows to reduce the mechanical stresses, which would be due to static 
pressure differences; 
 The choice of sodium as filling fluid allows to use systems of the same type to 
prevent and/or mitigate incident due to the sodium chemical reactivity (the use of a 
different filling fluid can add further precepts to the plant management). 
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5.2.2 CANDLE design criteria 
Candle diameter selection 
The choice of the candle vessel diameter has to be made taking into account the following 
issues: 
 Minimization of the overall Candle dimensions; 
 Costs minimization: 
- Use of standard commercial pipe for vessel and tubes for “U” tubes; 
- Candle vessel diameter large enough to house the three “U” bend tubes 
guaranteeing a gap to be filled with the stagnant sodium; 
 Diameter large enough to have a sufficient heat transfer surface from primary 
sodium to the stagnant secondary coolant; 
 Diameter large enough to allow an easy discharge of the stagnant secondary 
sodium (if any) in case of a SWR (failure of a tube), limiting the maximum pressure 
in order to minimize the severity of the accidental transient; 
 Diameter small enough to minimize the stagnant sodium thermal resistance. 
Taking into account these issues, a diameter of 0.1 m was selected in correspondence to 
a ¾” BWG 13 tube selected as reference for the “U” tubes. 
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Figure 24. Main dimensions of the “Candle” concept 
 
Finned/not finned 
In order to enhance the heat transfer performance of the steam generator, or to reduce the 
tube length with other parameters being equal, fins can be added in the riser tubes 
section. The presence of finned tubes could improve the heat transfer capability of the 
system but is strongly affected by the filling fluid choice in addition to the type and material 
of fins. In fact, if the thermal conductivity of the filling fluid, in which heat transfer is mainly 
based on conduction, is higher than that of the fins material, a solution based on not finned 
tubes results, obviously, preferable. 
In the reference case, where sodium has been selected as filling fluid, the not finned 
solution results to be the preferable since at 500 °C, AISI 316L has a thermal conductivity 
of about 20 W m-1 K-1 while the molten sodium has a thermal conductivity of about 65 W m-
1 K-1. The use of the not finned design solution means a reduced thermal resistance to the 
conductive heat transfer mechanism. 
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5.3 Paper on the radiation based DHX 
Conference: Proceedings of 30Th UIT Transfer Conference 
Date: Bologna, June 25-27, 2012 
Editor: S. Lazzari, E. Rossi Di Schio 
ISBN: 9788874885091 
Title: Innovative radiation-based Decay Heat Removal System 
Authors: Andrea De Santis, Matteo Nobili, Damiano Vitale Di Maio, Antonio Naviglio, 
Fabio Giannetti 
 
Abstract 
One of the main issues, regarding the development of Generation IV nuclear power plants, is 
the safety. In order to design nuclear systems characterized by enhanced safety features, an 
innovative and passive system, aimed at decay heat removal, especially suitable for sodium 
cooled fast reactors, has been developed. The attention is here mainly focused on an 
innovative, passive, decay heat removal system, proposed for liquid metal cooled reactors and 
based on a radiation-based bayonet tube heat exchanger that allows to remove decay heat 
from the primary coolant. Heat transfer is mainly guaranteed by the radiation mechanism, since 
each bayonet tube is equipped with a vacuum gap required to better decouple primary and 
secondary coolants and to detect possible leakage. The secondary fluid flows within the 
bayonet tubes in natural circulation. The proposed heat exchanger presents important 
advantages from the safety point of view, including the good compatibility between primary and 
secondary coolants, the good heat transfer properties of secondary fluids and, above all, the 
possibility to detect immediately any leak from both primary and secondary side, thanks to a 
continue monitoring of the vacuum gap pressure. In this paper, several CFD analyses, aimed at 
analyzing different parameters’ influence on the heat transfer capability of the system, have 
been discussed. 
Introduction 
The developing of the next generation of nuclear reactors (GEN IV) requires many efforts 
in terms of R&D and in the safety analysis field. Within the selected type of GEN IV 
nuclear reactors, Sodium Fast Reactors and Lead Fast Reactors represent, in Europe, first 
steps towards the future nuclear energy system. According to Generation IV International 
Forum, future-generation nuclear energy system must be designed with revolutionary 
improvements, in particular regarding sustainability, economics, safety and reliability, 
proliferation resistance and physical protection. Focusing on Safety and Reliability three 
points have been defined: 
1. Generation IV nuclear energy systems operation will excel in safety and reliability 
2. Generation IV nuclear energy systems will have a very low likelihood and degree of 
reactor core damage 
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3. Generation IV nuclear energy systems will eliminate the need for offsite emergency 
response 
To fulfill these requirements new projects and concepts have been developed, often 
foreseeing the introduction of passive components with a full capacity to sustain every kind 
of transient generated by an accident. In particular, a great interest is placed on Decay 
Heat Removal Systems (DHRS) which have to guarantee long term refrigeration of the 
core. In this paper the attention will be focused on the primary heat exchanger of a 
radiation-based DHRS and the heat transfer performance of the component will be 
analyzed. 
Decay Heat Removal System (DHRS) 
The purpose of the system is to maintain the primary coolant within a limited temperature 
range, in order to ensure an efficient cooling of the core and prevent any possibility to have 
a phase change that adversely affect the proper operation of the reactor. In a nuclear 
reactor the power produced into the fuel elements decreases with time, after the 
shutdown, with an exponential law P = P0 βt−α, where α and β are numerical coefficients. 
According with this condition, the DHRS has to remove the largest amount of decay heat 
in the first time of the transient and after a certain period of time it has to guarantee a 
lesser effective heat removal based on the lower limits for the temperature. This is much 
more true in case of Lead Fast Reactor, for which the freezing temperature of the primary 
coolant is closer to the operative one (about 327°C). [1] 
DHR Heat Exchanger 
Within the whole system, a fundamental role is played by the primary decay heat 
exchanger (DHX). The standard proposal for such a type of DHX foresees to use a shell 
and tubes heat exchanger with sodium as secondary coolant. The secondary coolant 
allows releasing heat to the external atmosphere and, in order to do that, it has to reach 
the atmosphere outside the reactor building. The innovative DHRS utilizes a radiation-
based bayonet tubes DHX. In this solution the primary coolant, driven by perforated shells, 
flows downward in contact with the external surface of the submerged DHX. The heat 
transfer between primary sodium and secondary coolant is mainly based on radiation 
between the hot internal surface of the outer tube and the cold external surface of the 
inner tube where the primary coolant is in contact with the outer tube while the secondary 
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coolant flows within the inner tube. Each bayonet tube is composed of three coaxial tubes 
(inner tube, intermediate tube and outer tube). The outer and the intermediate tubes are 
separated by a gap in which a high vacuum is obtained, in order to maximize the surface 
to surface radiative heat transfer mechanism (Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1. Bayonet tube concept 
 
The secondary fluid enters on the top by a cold header and circulates downward in the 
inner tube. The bottom part of the intermediate tube is closed by means of an hemispheric 
head while the inner tube is open at the bottom. In the lower head, the fluid turns back and 
circulates upward in the annular gap between the inner and the intermediate tubes. The 
vacuum gap allows an efficient radiative heat exchange between primary and secondary 
coolants. To improve thermal performance, the two surfaces separated by the vacuum gap 
are provided of fins (Fig. 2). The pressure in the annulus between the intermediate and the 
outer tubes should be continuously monitored to promptly detect any leakage from either 
side. The preliminary dimensions chosen for DHX tubes are reported in Tab. 1. A small 
inner tube diameter has been selected in order to analyze the system corresponding to the 
minimum DHX whole diameter. An optimization phase is foreseen in further design phase 
to meet fins manufacturability, pressure drop, heat transfer and overall DHX dimension 
requirements. A scheme of the bayonet-tubes distribution within the whole DHX is reported 
in Fig. 3. The design solution has been developed to be used in both Sodium Fast 
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Reactors and Lead Fast Reactors. In sodium application the secondary coolant could be 
diathermic oil, which guarantees higher safety grade with respect to water based systems, 
characterized by high risk of sodium water reactions occurrences. In lead applications, 
instead, water can easily be used as secondary coolant thanks to their compatibility. In this 
case the secondary circuit pressure has to be maintained high enough to ensure water to 
be always in liquid phase. 
 
Fig. 2. A scheme of the bayonet-tubes 
 
Tab. 1. Preliminary geometrical parameters 
Total DHX diameter 1.6 [ m ] 
DHX tube length 5 [ m ] 
External tubes OD 0.0318 [ m ] 
Intermediate tubes OD 0.0171 [ m ] 
Inner tube OD 0.0095 [ m ] 
Tubes thickness 0.0009 [ m ] 
Annular thickness 0.0065 [ m ] 
Fin height 0.0050 [ m ] 
Fine thickness 0.0010 [ m ] 
Fins for each surface 12  
Tube height 5 [ m ] 
Pitch/diameter ratio 1.3  
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As said, oil is an attractive fluid since it does not react violently with sodium and for its heat 
transfer capability. In order to avoid oil cracking and system pressurization, the oil has to 
operate below 385°C. For the simulations a synthetic and aromatic oil has been used, 
namely Therminol®75. It has a liquid operating temperature range between 80°C and 
385°C. Thermal-physical properties used for CFD analyses have been taken from a 
technical bulletin for the oil [2] and from a technical report by Argonne National Lab for 
Sodium [3]. 
CFD analysis 
To obtain a numerical characterization of the system, a CFD analysis for Sodium/Oil fluids 
has been performed. The analysis has been carried out with the aim of evaluating the 
influence of the temperature of the hot fluid on the thermal power exchanged by DHX. 
Simulation domain 
Simulations have been performed using a commercial CFD code based on the finite 
volume method. The computational domain reproduces one twelfth of the actual geometry 
of a single element, exploiting the symmetry which characterizes the hexagonal sub-
channel. A schematic representation of this domain is shown in Fig. 4. For turbulence 
modeling the RNG κ−ε model with wall functions has been used. The surface-to-surface 
radiation (S2S) model has been used in this simulation. This model can be used to take 
into account the radiation exchange in an enclosure of gray-diffuse surfaces. According to 
this model the energy exchange between two surfaces depends in part on their size, 
separation distance and orientation. All these parameters are accounted for by a 
geometric function called View Factor. The main assumption of this model is that any 
absorption, emission or scattering of radiation can be ignored, therefore only surface-to-
surface radiation need be considered for analysis. The mesh is composed of 1.1×106 
prisms with a triangular base, characterized by minimum dimensions variable according to 
the subdomain considered. A streamwise section of the mesh is shown in Fig. 5. shown in 
Fig. 5. A simulation flow time of 150 s has been used for the Sodium/Oil system in order to 
reach a steady state condition; for this purpose a time step of 0.03 s has been selected. 
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Fig. 3. Bayonet tubes distributions 
 
 
Fig. 4. Computational domain section 
 
Boundary conditions 
The boundary conditions, referred to Sodium/Oil system, are reported in Tab. 2. 
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Fig. 5. Mesh section 
 
Tab. 2. Sodium/Oil system boundary conditions 
  Thermal Oil Sodium 
Inlet    
 Velocity [m/s] 0.167 0.179 
 Temperature [K] 423 623 to 923 
 DH [m] 0.00574 0.014 
 T.I.a -b 4% 
Outlet    
 Rel. pressure [Pa] 0 0 
a Turbulence intensity 
b Laminar Flow 
 
Concerning the computational domain, the following boundary conditions, referred to Fig. 
4, have been applied: 
 blue surfaces: Symmetry 
 green surface: Wall - No Slip 
 red surfaces: Wall - Free Slip 
The finned surfaces’ emissivity has been conservatively chosen equal to 0.8. 
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The oil flows in laminar condition since the inlet Reynolds number is about 600 while for 
the Sodium side the flow is turbulent (Re = 8300). 
Further simulations involving Lead/Water system will have to be performed, imposing 
appropriate condition of similarity with respect to the Sodium/Oil System, with the aim of 
comparing different solutions. 
Results 
In order to evaluate the system performance several simulations have been performed. 
Since the heat transfer mechanism is mainly based on the radiation phenomenon, the 
most important parameter is the inlet temperature of the hot fluid. For this reason different 
values of the hot fluid inlet temperature have been analyzed. The heat transfer 
performance at different inlet temperature has been compared with a typical DHX suitable 
for SFR (TNa−inlet =550°C). 
Sodium/Oil System 
The Tab. 3 and the Fig. 6 show, for each case, the inlet temperature of the sodium and the 
exchanged thermal power in a single element. 
As shown in Fig. 6, the thermal power exchanged as function of Sodium inlet temperature 
can be well fitted by ˙Q =1.909×10−8T4.015. The fourth degree function is coherent with the 
main heat transfer mechanism (radiation) that characterizes the system. 
 
Tab. 3. Sodium/Oil system 
TinNa [K] Q[W] ToutOil [K] 
623 3216 480.32 
723 5670 520.49 
823 9548 579.98 
923 15624 665.03 
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Fig. 6. Sodium/Oil System - Power vs. Temperature 
 
Fig. 7 shows the evolution of mean temperatures of the two fluids as function of the heat 
exchanger height for the reference case. It can be noticed that the trend seems like that 
usual for a classical counter-flow heat exchanger. Oil temperature at the outlet section 
changes as reported in Tab. 3. As shown in Tab. 3, the maximum oil temperature remains 
within the operating temperature range in all cases except the last one. In this condition 
the oil cracking rate could be too high and a purification system would result necessary. 
Concerning the vapor pressure, a slight pressurization can be foreseen in order to 
maintain the oil in a single phase condition. In any case this condition corresponds to 
650°C that is not a realistic condition for SFRs. To provide a visual representation of axial 
and radial temperature fields, the temperature contours for the reference case are reported 
in Fig. 8. Pitch between each slice is equal to 0.5 meters. 
Lead/Water System 
Further studies will involve using of radiation-based bayonet-tubes DHX for Lead Fast 
Reactors. A LFR usually operates in a different and lower range of temperature respect to 
the Sodium Fast Reactor. In particular the ELFR project operates in the range 400/480°C 
inlet/outlet core during normal operations [4]. As known the radiative heat exchange is 
strongly influenced by the highest temperature of the system. It is reasonable to expect a 
less efficient radiative heat exchange with respect to the Sodium system. On the other 
hand the absence of high reactivity features with water allows using this coolant in place of 
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diathermic oil. The use of water imposes the pressurization of secondary side to avoid 
vaporization. Considering an inlet temperature for Lead side equal to 480°C and an inlet 
temperature for Water side equal to 150°C, the pressure of secondary side should be 
about 70 bar (Tsat = 285.8°C) to allow temperature variation of the water greater than 
100°C. 
 
Fig. 7. Sodium/Oil System - Power vs. Height 
 
 
Fig. 8. Sodium/Oil System - Temperature Fields 
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Conclusions 
In order to evaluate the performance of a radiation-based DHX, several CFD simulations 
have been performed. In particular, with reference to the SFRs, the response of the heat 
exchanger to temperature variations of the hot fluid has been evaluated. The data 
obtained for the exchanged thermal power as a function of the temperature of sodium can 
be fitted with a fourth degree curve, confirming the dominant character of irradiation in the 
operation of the device. Hot fluid temperature influence makes the heat exchanger 
particularly suitable for application in the nuclear field as DHX especially in next generation 
of nuclear power plants. This is because the features of the device allow to easily adapt 
the system to the power decay of the core. The proposed DHX coupled with an 
appropriate heat sink for the secondary fluid, as described in [5], allows to remove the 
decay heat indefinitely in time without any external intervention. Further developments of 
the project will include the geometry optimization and the engineering of the heat 
exchanger. Additional CFD analyses will be performed in order to verify the behavior of the 
DHX with different primary and secondary fluids such as lead or lead-bismuth eutectic and 
water. 
 
Nomenclature 
DH  Hydraulic Diameter [m] 
DHRS Decay Heat Removal System 
DHX Decay Heat Exchanger 
ELFR European Lead Fast Reactor 
˙Q Total thermal power for a single DHX element [W] 
SFR Sodium Fast Reactor 
TinNa Sodium Inlet Temperature [K] 
ToutOil Oil Outlet Temperature [K] 
Tsat Saturation Temperature [°C] 
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6 JOINED APPLICATION OF DEVELOPED 
SAFETY SYSTEMS 
 
6.1 Paper on the application of the radiation-based DHX to the 
innovative pool 
Journal: International Journal of Risk Theory 
Year: 2012 
Volume: 2 (no.1) 
Pages: 11 - 31 
Title: Proposal of a high reliability DHR system for NPPs with never ending capacity 
Authors: G. Caruso, L. Ferroni, F. Giannetti, A. Naviglio, D. Vitale Di Maio 
 
Abstract 
The present paper aims at describing a totally innovative top-reliability Decay Heat Removal 
(DHR) system suitable for application in Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). It is completely passive 
and with a never ending capacity. The configuration here described is mainly addressed to 
liquid metal cooled nuclear reactors, but is based on a sub-system also applicable to any type of 
nuclear power plant and even to some chemical plants. The main subsystems of the innovative 
DHR System are patent pending. 
The paper is mainly based on the work carried out in the framework of the CP ESFR (European 
Sodium Fast Reactor) project (7th R&TD FP of the EU); the research leading to these results 
has received funding from the European Community’s Seventh R&TD Framework Programme 
(FP7/2007-2011) under grant agreement n° 232658. 
The innovative DHR system is based on a Direct Reactor Cooling System (DRC): the DRC is 
basically made of a loop (in this case, with oil as coolant) receiving nuclear decay heat through 
a Radiation-based bayonet Decay Heat Exchanger (DHX) and transferring the heat through 
natural circulation to an innovative external Air cooled Heat Exchanger (AHX), using water and 
air as heat sink during the cooling phase. The patent pending DHX is a sodium / vacuum / oil 
Bayonet-tubes type. The thermal power is transferred from primary nuclear coolant (in the 
paper, sodium) to oil of the DRC loop through radiation in the vacuum gap of the bayonet. 
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The patent pending AHX is an oil/ water-air pool heat exchanger, which transfers thermal power 
from oil to different fluids: water at the beginning of the transient, when the decay thermal power 
to remove is the highest; then, following the decrease of the decay heat, and after the 
vaporization of the boiling water, thermal power is transferred from oil to air (that replaces water 
in the pool without any external intervention). This AHX was conceived and developed for top-
reliability cooling in PWRs, but has a generalized applicability. Preliminary analyses have 
demonstrated the reliable operation of the two innovative sub-systems (DHX and AHX) coupled 
in the SFR project, in an absolutely reliable natural circulation DRC. 
The absence of risks due to anticipated failure of the barriers either/both on the primary or/and 
on the secondary side of the DHX, due to the vacuum gap presence as well as the perfect 
compatibility of the secondary oil with the primary coolant (sodium), make this concept a very 
attractive solution for the diversified ESFR DRC passive system. The same concept is 
applicable to Lead Fast Reactors as well. It is interesting to underline that the innovative DHR 
concept is easily implemented in every industrial plant where, should an hazardous accident 
occur, a heat removal system can avoid more dangerous consequences (i.e.: in Nuclear Power 
Plants, in severe accident management, eventually substituting oil with other coolant; in 
chemical plants to manage run-away reactions). 
 
Decay Heat Removal relevance in nuclear power plants 
It is well known that during operation of a nuclear power plant, heat is generated in the 
nuclear fuel (heat generation in other components is irrelevant in the scope of this paper). 
The main contribution to heat generation is due to nuclear fission reactions, originated by 
interaction between neutrons and fissile isotopes (U235 and Pu239 in thermal reactors, or 
several isotopes of Uranium and other transuranic elements in fast reactors); a typical 
fission reaction is shown in Fig. 1. 
0n
1 + 92U
235 →  92U
236 →    56Ba
137 + 36Kr
97 +20n
1 
Fig. 1. Example of a typical  fission reaction 
 
In the fission reaction shown (a high probability fission reaction, applicable to thermal 
reactors but representative of any fission reaction), a neutron interacts with a heavy 
isotope (in this case, U235), an instable nucleus of U236 is generated, which breaks into 
two  “fragments”, namely two medium weight isotopes (in this case, Ba137 and Kr97) and 
two fast neutrons. 
Since in the reaction a loss of mass occurs (of the order of 0,2 atomic mass unit, that is the 
ratio between 1 g and the Avogadro number, the number of atoms in a g-mole), this is 
translated into energy release (about 200 MeV per fission). 
Most of this energy is immediately released as kinetic energy of the reaction fragments 
(including fast neutrons; about 85%) and this causes heat generation in the fuel 
assemblies (and moderator, if present); a part of the energy (about 4%) is released 
through immediate emission of fission gamma rays and a part of energy is “accumulated” 
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in the form of a potential energy in the nuclei of main fission fragments, which are in a 
unstable configuration. This instability is the cause of modifications in these nuclei, with 
new nuclear reactions occurring in time, leading to nucleus modification and to the delayed 
emission of energy (this process may occur in several steps, involving several “fission 
products”). As shown in Tab. 1, delayed energy emission is mainly associated to electrons 
(beta radiation) and additional gamma rays; this process is named isotope decay and 
takes time to occur (each isotope decay is characterized by a given type and energy 
emission, and by a given “average” time, identified through the “half-life” of that decay). 
This means that, after fission, a “decay heat” continues to be generated in the fuel. 
Tab. 1. U235 fission energy distribution 
 MeV/fission % 
Instantaneous energy release 
• Kinetic energy of fission fragments 
• γ rays energy 
• Kinetic energy of neutrons 
 
Delayed energy 
• β from fission products 
• γ from fission products 
• γ from neutronic captures 
 
Tot 
 
 
 
169 
 
8 
5 
 
 
8 
7 
7 
 
204 
 
 
 
83 
 
4 
2.5 
 
 
 
3,5 
3,5 
3,5 
 
100 
 
An additional contribution to the “decay heat” in nuclear fuel involves the absorption of 
neutrons mainly by high weight isotopes (namely actinides or other isotopes of heavy 
elements): also in this case, the absorption leads to the generation of isotopes not stable, 
subject to modifications in their nucleus, with the delayed release of radiations (gamma 
rays, electrons, etc.), so of thermal power. A typical neutron absorption reaction is show in 
Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Example of a typical neutron capture reaction and following decays 
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For these two causes, one directly connected to fission, the other one to neutron capture, 
in nuclear fuel heat continues being generated also after the reactor shutdown, i.e., after 
the end of the fission process. 
In Fig. 3, a typical decay heat generation curve is shown: at the shutdown time from a 
rated power generation, the decay heat drops instantaneously to some 7% of the rated 
power; after one hour it is reduced to some 1,5%, after one day to some 0,5%. In case of a 
nuclear reactor generating 3000 MWth in the core at rated power (corresponding to some 
1000 MWe), after one day the generation is 15 MWth, 
 
 
Fig. 3. Example of typical decay heat generation curve for SFR 
 
Decay heat has to be removed, even in nuclear plant accidental conditions, to guarantee 
fuel integrity, so avoiding quite worse hazards.  
In fact, it has to be remarked that the isotopes generating the decay heat are the same 
isotopes responsible of the release of radioactivity into the environment in case of an 
accidental scenario involving their release into the environment (not all isotopes have the 
same behaviour in the release phase and their effect on biosphere is characteristic for 
each isotope). 
In our scope, what is essential is that in the reactor core of nuclear reactors, when a 
shutdown occurs, the fission chain reactions are stopped but, because of decay heat 
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release by fuel, thermal power generation continues in the fuel at considerable levels for a 
long time. This power must be absolutely removed in order to guarantee fuel cooling and, 
consequently, its integrity, without release from fuel cladding of radioactive isotopes and, 
even worse, without cladding and fuel melting (severe accident). Therefore, in order to 
avoid unacceptable fuel heating, in all NPPs suitable systems aimed at removal of Decay 
Heat are always foreseen.  
Generally, in non-accident conditions, after a reactor shutdown Decay Heat removal is 
initially guaranteed through the nuclear heat utilization system (steam generators feeding 
plant turbine), while in a second phase a dedicated heat removal system enters into 
operation, bringing nuclear coolant temperature to levels compatible with the refuelling 
operations. Nevertheless, due to the extreme importance of Decay Heat Removal even in 
accident conditions, dedicated safety systems (safety-grade Decay Heat Removal 
Systems - DHRS) are foreseen and their design specifications are coherent with the 
highest safety standards. 
Most existing safety DHR systems rely on the operation of cooling circuits including 
pumps, heat exchangers, valves; part of the primary coolant is spilled and it releases heat 
to a second fluid in a closed circuit. This second fluid, in turn, releases heat to another 
fluid, that can be the final heat sink (river or sea water; air through cooling towers, etc.). 
Many active components allow the operation of the safety DHR system, and electric power 
is needed both for the operation of pumps and for control devices and instrumentation. A 
safety electric supply system is needed; the application of the highest design codes and 
the application of criteria of redundancy and diversification contribute to the reliability of the 
safety Decay Heat Removal system.  
Nevertheless, in a new perspective of plant safety, very high reliability levels may be 
achieved avoiding the bottleneck of availability of electric supply systems: the safety is 
based, in this case, not bringing to the extreme consequences the active system 
duplication concept, but identifying a robust design based on the use of simple physical 
laws, simple components, natural circulation of fluids, with a never ending cooling 
capability. 
This approach has been applied in the proposed innovative DHR design, with a specific 
application in SFRs. 
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Design criteria for safety DHR systems in IV Generation 
General safety design criteria in ESFR project include design margins, diversity, 
redundancy, structural protection and physical separation of the safety relevant systems, 
structures and components and the effectiveness of the defence-in-depth concept. 
As already stated, the main goal of the safety DHR system is to provide a safe heat 
removal from the primary system to assure, in case of reactor shutdown or trip, in any 
plant condition, the integrity of the reactor core, remaining at an acceptably low 
temperature. 
The function of decay heat removal can be achieved through different systems, 
characterized by active or passive components. Both types of these safety systems must 
have all components in a safety grade class but the main difference, between active and 
passive systems, is due to their dependence on external mechanical or electrical power, 
signals or forces. Thanks to the reliance on natural laws only, passive systems require a 
lower number of components for a same system reliability target.  
This is why new DHRs are often based on passive systems, in order to obtain higher 
safety performance with fewer components, according with one of the main goals for 
Generation IV plants that is “to eliminate the technical need for off-site emergency 
response”. 
In particular, to guarantee an adequate and reliable core decay heat removal function 
when the reactor is in shutdown conditions, the following safety features are required to 
the dedicated system: 
 to guarantee a long term core cooling; 
 to maintain structural integrity and operability of primary circuit components. 
To fit with such features, the design criteria for the Decay Heat Removal system must 
include: 
 Reliability, system diversity and independence, redundancy 
The passive safety DHR system must include redundant systems, preferably based 
on different concepts and components, designed so as to avoid common mode 
failures (in this paper, one possible DHR system is described) 
 Maintainability 
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Since safety DHR systems may be required to guarantee the highest design reliability 
for a long period, the components must be easily maintainable: easy accessibility and 
a limited number of components to be maintained are, obviously, important. 
 
Referring to the design criteria for safety DHR systems in IV Generation NPPs, ESFR 
DHR systems are to achieve the DHR function with a Direct Reactor Cooling (DRC) 
system, composed of passive and active loops, by means of dip coolers (DHX), that 
extract heat from the primary sodium vessel, as shown in Fig. 4 for a pool-type EFSR NPP 
reactor tank.  
 
Fig. 4. Pool EFSR NPP tank scheme  
 
All loops extract heat from the primary sodium of the hot pool (T Na = 530°C) by means of 
immersed sodium/sodium dip coolers (DHX), and reject the heat to the environment using 
sodium/air heat exchangers (AHX) located, at a certain elevation, near the reactor 
building; a simplified scheme is shown in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5. Pool EFSR NPP DHR (DHX + AHX) scheme  
 
With reference to safety-grade Direct Reactor Cooling, a new concept for an ESFR 
passive, inherently safe Decay Heat Removal (DHR) system is described in the 
following: both the DHX and the AHX are based on innovative concepts; in the 
following, the innovative AHX system is called PHX. 
The DRC loop includes a Radiation-based bayonet DHX and an innovative AHX 
system, using water and air as heat sink.  
The DHX is a sodium / vacuum / oil Bayonet-tubes type. Thermal power is transferred 
from primary sodium to secondary oil through radiation in the vacuum gap of the 
bayonet. 
The PHX is an oil/ water-air pool heat exchanger, which transfers thermal power from oil 
to water at the beginning of the transient, when the decay thermal power to remove is 
the highest. Then, following the decrease of the decay heat, it starts transferring heat 
from oil to air that replaces water in the pool without any external intervention. 
Innovative DHR description 
Introduction 
The innovative safety DHR here proposed refers, as for the geometrical and functional 
data, to conditions indicative of the ESFR design. “Easy” modifications may apply in case 
of different operational specifications. 
The proposal of the innovative safety DHR system is based on the consideration that 
because of the limited number of components involved in passive systems and of the 
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independence from availability of power at the site and from human intervention, they may, 
in principle, lead both to economic advantages and to safety enhancement. 
Safety systems must have at least two different states: the first one corresponds to the 
normal plant operating condition and the second one corresponds to the safety operating 
condition. In order to change from normal to safety condition, and to be able to operate in 
safety conditions, it will be necessary to have: a signal to detect the need, as well as a 
driving force to change the state and the necessary means to operate in the new state. If 
these three features rely on passive components, the system may be defined as passive. 
Moreover, referring to passive systems, an important difference between moving and static 
systems exists. The more similar the two operating states of a system are, the less failure 
modes of the system will be. According to this, passive systems are classified, by IAEA, in 
four different classes (from lower to higher passive characteristics) depending on their 
main features, i.e. mechanical moving parts, moving fluids, requirement of input signals.  
The innovative system here proposed, is characterized by only moving fluids. 
The DHX is made of bayonet tubes with oil as secondary fluid and vacuum in the gap 
(patent pending). The thermal power is transferred from primary sodium to secondary oil 
through radiation in the vacuum gap of the bayonet (in this paper, oil is the reference fluid 
for the secondary circuit but also other fluids and geometries may be considered, in order 
to optimize the solution). Thanks to the special configuration of the DHX, the contact 
between primary sodium and secondary oil can be considered impossible, because the 
vacuum gap allows detecting any possible leak both from the primary and the secondary 
sides. In any case, oil is an attractive alternative fluid instead of water or air, because it 
does not react violently with sodium and it presents interesting heat transfer capability 
(better than air, but worse than water). Nevertheless, oil has to flow at temperatures lower 
than 350-400°C (and also beyond 400°C, depending on the specific oil used) because, 
beyond the maximum allowable temperature, there is a risk of oil cracking.  
The PHX is a special oil / water – air pool heat transfer system (patent pending as well), 
already proposed in an innovative LWR design. It allows transferring thermal power from 
oil to water in the pool, when the decay power has its highest value (first phase of the 
transient). Then, when the water content in the pool has partially/totally vaporized, air 
replaces water inside the pool allowing a never ending heat removal. High heat transfer 
efficiency is guaranteed also with air by a special design of the pool heat transfer system. 
The whole system operates in natural circulation. 
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A simplified scheme of the proposal innovative safety DHR system is shown in Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 6. Simplified scheme of the proposal innovative safety DHR system 
 
The preliminary innovative DHR design has been carried out referring to thermal power 
initially to remove equal to 15 MW through each loop. 
DRC loop description 
The proposed DRC loop is schematically shown in Fig. 7: the primary sodium flows 
downward in contact with the external surfaces of the Radiation-based Bayonet DHX 
immersed in the sodium tank. The secondary fluid is oil (alternative fluids may be 
considered).  
Heat transfer between primary sodium and secondary oil is mainly based on radiation 
between the hot external tube surfaces, in contact with sodium, and the cold intermediate 
tube surfaces, in contact with oil. To allow better thermal performance, high vacuum has 
been foreseen in the gap between the outer and the intermediate tubes. Furthermore, the 
radiation surfaces have been designed finned to increase the heat transfer area. 
The secondary / tertiary fluid heat exchanger is an innovative oil/water-air pool HX (PHX; 
again, oil is foreseen in this paper, but other fluids may be considered as well). The heated 
oil, which comes from the bayonet DHX, flows inside a tube bundle immersed in the PHX 
pool, which, at the beginning, is full of water. The PHX allows transferring thermal power 
from oil to water, when the decay power has its highest value (starting of the transient). 
Water at first is heated, than boils and finally air replaces water within the pool, allowing a 
never ending heat removal. 
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Fig. 7. Simplified operational loop of the innovative DRC 
 
The new DHX Concept description 
The proposed concept is a bayonet tube exchanger which uses oil as secondary fluid. 
Each bayonet tube is composed of three co-axial tubes (inner tube, intermediate tube and 
outer tube). The outer and the intermediate tubes are separated by a gap in which high 
vacuum is obtained as shown in Fig. 8. 
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Fig. 8. Na / vacuum / oil bayonet tube concept 
 
The secondary fluid (thermal oil) enters on the top from a cold header and circulates 
downward in the inner tubes. In the tube lower part, oil turns back and circulates upwards 
in the annular gap between the inner tube and the intermediate tube. Oil is separated from 
the primary sodium by two walls. The vacuum gap, within these two walls, allows an 
efficient radiation heat transfer between the internal surface of the outer tube and the 
external surface of the intermediate tube. Fig. 9 shows a possible type of fins to improve 
radiant heat transmission. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Na / vacuum / oil bayonet tube section 
 
Hot 
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Pressure in the vacuum annulus between the outer and the intermediate tubes may be 
continuously monitored to promptly detect a leakage from either wall. 
Primary sodium circulates downwards outside the tubes bundle, guided by an outer 
perforated shell, as shown in Fig. 10. 
 
 
 
 
SODIUM 
 
 
Outer Tube 
 
 
VACUUM 
 
Intermediate Tube (Aluminum) 
- Emissivity = 0.9 
 
OIL 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Simplified operational mode of the innovative DHX dipped in the tank 
 
The heat transfer, allowed by this kind of bayonet tubes, can be divided as follows: 
 Convection in the primary fluid (sodium); 
 Conduction in both walls between oil and sodium; 
 Radiation in the vacuum gap; 
 Convection in the secondary fluid (oil). 
In Fig. 11, a tubes bundle section is shown, where oil headers (hot and cold headers) and 
external perforated shell are shown. 
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Fig. 11. Innovative DHX tube bundle section  
Geometry 
The dimensions preliminarily chosen for the Radiation-based Bayonet DHX tubes are 
reported in Tab. 2 and in Fig. 12. 
 
Tab. 2. Radiation-based bayonet DHX main geometrical parameters  
 
 
DHX Tubes number 1400 [ ] 
Total DHX diameter 1.9 [ m ] 
DHX tube length 5 [ m ] 
External Tubes OD 0.0377 [ m ] 
Intermediate tube OD 0.0200 [ m ] 
Inner tube OD 0.0138 [ m ] 
Tubes thickness 0.0009 [ m ] 
Annular thickness 0.0065 [ m ] 
Fin height 0.0050 [ m ] 
Fin thickness 0.0010 [ m ] 
N° of fins (for each surface) 15 [ ] 
Tube height 5 [m] 
Pitch/diameter ratio 1.3 [ ] 
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Fig. 12. Radiation-based bayonet DHX fin dimensions 
 
The external and the internal tubes of each bayonet are made of Austenitic Stainless 
Steel. The intermediate tube of the bayonet is made of aluminum. The selected materials 
are compatible with fluids and simplify the feasibility and the manufacture of the bayonet 
tube. The emissivity of both the finned radiation surfaces (the inner surface of the outer 
tube made of stainless steel and the outer surface of the intermediate tube made of 
aluminum) has been hypothesized equal to 0.9. It is a realistic value due the possibility of 
surface treatments industrially achievable. Other geometries with different DHX tube 
dimensions have been studied. The small diameter allows to minimize the whole DHX 
diameter but in presence of a limited hydraulic head higher diameters may be required to 
guarantee acceptable performance in natural circulation. 
Secondary fluid 
Oil is an attractive fluid since it does not react violently with sodium (the possibility of 
interaction between the two fluids is associated to a double barrier rupture) and it presents 
interesting heat transfer capability. 
As a possible oil candidate we refer to a synthetic heat transfer fluid used in non-
pressurized / low-pressure, indirect heating systems, which has to operate at temperatures 
lower than 350°C to avoid cracking. The high boiling point of this thermal oil helps reducing 
the volatility and fluid leakage; moreover, it is noncorrosive to metals commonly used in 
5 mm 
1mm 
6.4mm 
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heat transfer systems. The main thermal-hydraulic parameters of the chosen oil are 
reported in Tab. 3. 
Tab. 3. Reference oil thermodynamic characteristics  
Temperature Density 
Specific 
heat (cp) 
Cinematic 
Viscosity 
Thermal 
conductivity 
[°C] [kg | m^3] [J | kg °K] [cStoke] [m^2 | s] [W | m K] 
25 851 1910 60 6.00E-06 0.1313 
50 835 2001 21 2.10E-06 0.1293 
100 802 2185 5 5.00E-07 0.1253 
200 738 2551 2.4 2.40E-07 0.1173 
250 705 2734 2.2 2.20E-07 0.1133 
275 689 2826 2.19 2.19E-07 0.1113 
The innovative PHX concept 
The PHX is a heat transfer sub-system characterized by a simple configuration but 
including special devices (patent pending) allowing an optimal use for heat removal 
whenever the power to remove decreases with time. It was developed for new LWRs and 
for applications in the chemical field. 
The heat exchanger is made of several vertical finned tubes, arranged in a square matrix. 
Each tube has four fins with a height equal to half the space between two adjacent tubes; 
in this way tubes and fins give place to a number of sub channels almost equal to the 
number of tubes. The fins of adjacent tubes are welded in order to create closed channels; 
all fins of the HX tubes have loopholes in their lower zone creating communications among 
channels and to let the cooling fluid distribution inside channels. Views of main parts of the 
innovative heat exchanger are shown in Fig. 13. 
 
Fig. 13. Views of main parts of the innovative heat exchanger (not designed according to real dimensions): 
a) an isometric view of a part of the heat exchanger, b) a single finned tube, c) the separating septum with loopholes. 
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The PHX is foreseen to be dipped in a pool, initially filled with sub-cooled water, made  of 
two different volumes; the first one hosts the heat exchanger while the second one has no 
mechanical components inside. The two volumes are divided by a separating septum 
which is equipped in the lower half part of its height by loopholes as in the case of the fins, 
as shown in Fig. 14. 
 
 
Fig. 14. PHX pool section 
 
The loopholes foreseen on the septum and on the fins allow both water flow towards the 
sub-channels where water vaporizes, and automatically, progressive changing of the 
tertiary fluid, with substitution of water by air with the progressive lowering of water level, 
without any external intervention; this system configuration  allows a never ending heat 
removal process. 
Operating condition description 
During normal operation of the plant, the PHX is in a stand-by condition thanks to a special 
component (i.e. a special passive valve, not analyzed in this paper) that limits the oil 
circulation in the secondary circuit avoiding a continuous release of large amount of 
thermal power to the heat sink. The valve characteristics must allow a suitable maximum 
oil temperature. 
In this condition, pool water evaporation is strongly limited but, in any case, a feed water 
circuit with a quite limited flow is foreseen, to maintain the desired water level in stand-by 
conditions (no requirement of intervention for the safety DHR system). 
Hot oil 
Cold oil 
Septum 
Pool 
free 
volume 
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When the system has to intervene, the valve will open, with an increased oil flow. The 
decay heat will be released to sub-cooled water (35°C) flowing in natural circulation 
through the sub-channels inside the pool, during the first transient phase; afterwards, 
when the water level begins to uncover the loopholes because of vaporization, the heat 
sink becomes a mixture of air, vapor and water; the selection of component dimensions 
(and of the amount of water) will allow the heat removal by air only, when the decay heat 
will be low enough for a completely safe operation. 
The system operating condition can be divided into three different periods. Referring to 
Fig. 15, during the first transient period pool water temperature rises until the saturation 
point is reached (Fig. 15 - a). At that time, due to vaporization, the water level starts to 
decrease (Fig. 15 - b); during preliminary system design, the possible low feedwater refill 
is not taken into account for safety reasons. The second period is characterized by a 
“mixed” heat sink made of air together with boiling water (Fig. 15 - c); this period starts 
when the water level is low enough to reach and uncover the loopholes in the septum and 
in the fins. The third and last period starts when water is no more present and external air 
is the only heat sink, entering and flowing upwards into the sub-channels through the holes 
(Fig. 15 - d). 
Thanks to the decreasing trend of the decay heat, the air heat sink capability, even if lower 
than the water heat sink capability, will result high enough to remove the decay heat, 
keeping the oil temperature (secondary fluid) under the upper limit. 
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Fig. 15. Simplified scheme of the operating condition of the PHX system 
 
The secondary fluid (thermal oil) enters on the top of the heat exchanger and flows 
downward, within the tubes, releasing heat to the tertiary fluid (water / air). On the pool 
side, water at first, and air later on, flow upward, through the sub channels, in natural 
circulation. 
In order to improve the heat transfer capability when air is the only heat sink, each tube 
may be equipped with a higher number of fins (greater than four). 
Geometry 
The main geometrical parameters of the system are reported in Tab. 4 and in Fig. 16. 
Some details of the heat exchanger are shown in Fig. 16. PHX HX tube main geometrical 
parameters [mm] 
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Tab. 4. PHX pool main geometrical parameters 
Tubes OD 0.0127 [ m ] 
Tubes thickness 0.00125 [ m ] 
Fin height 0.0064 [ m ] 
Fin thickness 0.00125 [ m ] 
Number of fins 4 [ ] 
Tube height 8.00 [m] 
Pitch/diameter ratio 2 [ ] 
Fin loopholes maximum quote 4.00 [m] 
 
 
Fig. 16. PHX HX tube main geometrical parameters [mm] 
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Fig. 17. Details of the Heat Exchanger of the PHX system (immersed tubes and headers) 
 
Tertiary fluid  
Thanks to the special features of the heat sink, the tertiary fluid change during the 
transient operating period. The tertiary fluid, whose behavior is analyzed in the following, 
will be: 
 Sub-cooled water during the first transient period; 
 Boiling water plus air during the second transient period; 
 Air during the last transient period. 
The reference boundary conditions of the pool here considered are: 
 Sub-cooled water starting from 30°C at the beginning of the transient period; 
 Saturation temperature (at atmospheric pressure) during the boiling period; 
 Air at 35°C at the pool inlet. 
First heat removal calculations 
Assuming a nominal power of 3600 MWth for a large SFR, it is hypothesized that two 
safety DHR systems intervene when some 0.8% of nominal power is reached, which is 
about 30 MWth of thermal decay power to remove, as shown in Fig. 18. 
It may be assumed that two independent safe DHR systems are available, one active and 
one passive, or two passive but different, each one equipped with three independent DHR 
loops; it may be also assumed that each loop extracts 15 MWth, that is to say a total of 90 
MWth can to be removed (heat removal capacity by both systems: 300% nominal heat 
decay to remove). 
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Fig. 18. Decay heat to remove in the reference configuration 
 
The reference configuration (reference thermal power equal to some 30 MW), extracted 
from the previous figure, occurs at 34525 s after the reactor shutdown.  
Each innovative DHR system loop is verified for removal of 50% of that power. 
The number of tubes in the PHX is assumed as 50.000. Optimization could lead to minor 
number of tubes (depending also on oil cracking characteristics). 
The primary flow rate and the inlet temperature of sodium have been defined according to 
possible design values of SFRs.  
The secondary flow rate has been identified through the equilibrium between the pressure 
losses and the natural circulation head on the secondary / tertiary circuit. 
The thermal-hydraulic characteristics of the DRC loop in the reference configuration are 
reported in Tab. 5 (transient starting time). 
 
Tab. 5. DRC thermal-hydraulic parameters  
Sodium initial temperature 530°C 
Primary sodium mass flow rate 181 kg/s 
Water temperature 30 °C 
Power removed 15 MW 
 
30 MW 
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Several pool configurations have been analyzed: a series of different reference thermal 
power have been chosen, simulating the different pool conditions to evaluate the thermal 
performance of the DRC loop. Five different test cases have been taken into account: 
 PHX pool full of water (100%) at 30°C 
 PHX pool full of water (100%) at 80°C 
 PHX pool full of water (100%) at saturation conditions 
 PHX pool with 75% of air entering at 35°C; to be conservative the presence of 
water, present in 25% volume and removing heat through boiling, has been 
neglected in the evaluation of thermal performance 
 PHX pool full of air (100%) entering at 35°C. 
The thermal - hydraulic characteristics of the DRC loop for the chosen test cases are 
reported in Tab. 6. 
Tab. 6. DRC thermal-hydraulic parameters for different thermal cases  
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[W] [ s ]  [ °C ] [ °C ] [ °C ] [ °C ] [ kg | s ] 
1.50E+07 34525 
A - Sub-cooled 
Water (100%) 
30 32 275 33 26.0 
1.12E+07 84501 
B - Sub-cooled 
Water (100%) 
80 81 226 83 32.7 
1.03E+07 109036 
C - Saturation 
water (100%) 
100 - 232 103 33.0 
5.80E+06 685852 
D - Air 
(75%) 
35 181 223 138 27.5 
3.91E+06 1058299 
E - Air 
(100%) 
35 138 164 84 21.5 
 
As can be noted, there is a margin between the maximum oil temperature shown in Tab. 6 
and the maximum allowable oil temperature (350°C); a second PHX pool configuration 
could be analyzed where the number of the PHX tubes decreases from 50.000 to allow a 
further reduction of the PHX dimensions and costs. 
Referring to thermal-hydraulic parameters in Tab. 6, the oil hot leg temperature trend, 
related to the reference configuration, is shown in the Fig. 19, where - in different colors - 
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the three different states of the pool heat sink are represented. The temperature trend, 
during the shifting phase from boiling water heat sink to air-only heat sink, is estimated 
with conservative assumptions: during the period of coexistence of boiling water and air 
flow in the mixed heat sink, only the air contribution is taken into account. The real trend of 
the oil hot leg temperature, that can be obtained in further stages of the study, is expected 
to be lower than (or equal to) the trend shown in the figure. 
 
 
 
Fig. 19. Oil hot leg temperature trend after shutdown  
 
 
Tab. 7 summarizes the geometrical and thermal–hydraulic parameters, only concerning 
the initial period of the transient phases (starting time), of the new proposed safety DHR 
system, made of a Radiation-based bayonet DHX and an innovative PHX, pool type 
special heat transfer system. 
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E 
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Tab. 7. New proposed safety DHR system - main geometrical and thermal–hydraulic parameters 
New DRC concept   
Thermal – hydraulics 
parameters concerning 
initial time 
Power removed 15 MW 
Sodium temperatures 530°C/464°C 
Primary mass flow rate 181 kg/s 
Oil temperatures 275°C/ 33°C 
Secondary mass flow rate 26.0 kg/s 
Pool temperature 30 °C 
   
Geometrical features of 
the: 
 
Radiation-based 
bayonet  
Na / vacuum / oil DHX 
Outer tube (O.D. and t) 0.0377 m (0.00089 m) 
Intermediate tube (O.D. and t) 0.0200 m (0.00089 m) 
Inner tube (O.D. and t) 0.0138 m (0.00089 m) 
Number of tubes 1400 
Bundle diameter 1.9 m 
Increase in the tube bundle 
diameter compared to DHX 
with “U” tubes 
~110% 
Exchange area (considering 
outer diameter of the outer 
tube) 
~ 800 m2 
   
Geometrical features of 
the: 
AHX 
Oil / water -> air 
tube (O.D. and t) 0.0127 m (0.00125 m) 
Number of tubes 50000 
Pool dimensions 20 m x 20 m x 8 m 
 
Conclusions 
The proposed innovative passive safety DHR system, DRC type, shows quite a number of 
interesting aspects, mainly in terms of safety. 
Regarding the Radiation-based bayonet DHX, the use of oil as secondary fluid (which is 
perfectly compatible with sodium) together with the vacuum gap (which allows to promptly 
detect any leakage) allow to exclude any risk both on primary and on secondary side of 
the heat exchanger. 
In further stages of design, fluids alternative to oil may be considered; the reference to the 
final layout of the various components could lead to a different DHX diameter. 
Also the innovative concept of the PHX (which is, among others, extremely simple and 
cheap) ensures a high heat transfer capability in the first part of the transient (phase of 
cooling by water) and a never ending heat removal capability in natural circulation (phase 
of cooling by air). The oil temperatures remain lower than the maximum allowable oil 
temperature needed to avoid oil cracking (300 –400 °C). 
The technological feasibility is possible, also thanks to the chosen material for the 
intermediate tube (which is aluminum). It must be remarked that the selected solution 
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avoids any amount of sodium (not only primary sodium) flowing outside the reactor tank: 
this is considered a quite innovative feature, extremely relevant for safety and for simplicity 
and reliability of nuclear plant operation and maintenance. 
 
Nomenclature / Acronyms 
AHX Air cooled Heat eXchanger 
DHX Decay Heat eXchanger 
DRC  Direct Reactor Cooling system 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
PHX Pool water/air cooled Heat eXchanger 
SFR Sodium Fast Reactor 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
In the present work some innovative concepts, conceived and studied in these years, have 
been analyzed. In order to make possible a widespread diffusion of nuclear reactors, 
increased, easy-to-demonstrate and unaffectable safety features have to be guaranteed. 
The main purpose of the present work is to show the unique features that innovative 
passive safety systems can guarantee. The development of not industrialized regions will 
lead to nuclear reactors construction also in areas where electricity is not, at present, 
produced through NPPs. In these regions it is particularly important that the plant are easy 
to operate and have special safety features: hence the NPP has to be characterized by 
very enhanced safety standards. The best way to reach highest safety standards is to 
avoid, as much as possible, initiating events that could lead to accidental conditions, 
preventing them by design. This philosophy, called “safety by design”, allows reducing 
accidental conditions occurrence. 
The systems here analyzed are mostly based on this criterion, since the pool allows 
reducing the DHRS failure probability exploiting a water heat sink and later an air heat sink 
only by means of natural laws. Natural laws are exploited for activation, for operation and 
for shifting from water to air heat sink. The pool system, always available and extremely 
reliable, minimizes the decay heat removal function failure probability. 
The radiation-based DHX foresees a further barrier between the primary sodium and the 
diathermic oil. This further barrier, characterized by a vacuum volume, allows at the same 
time to obtain a promptly detection of any leakage, the minimization of primary / secondary 
coolants interaction even if the use of the diathermic oil, instead of water, makes the 
interaction less hazardous. The elimination by design of the SWR occurrence means that 
the system design requirements are less stringent and hence cheaper. Moreover, the use 
of a complete decoupling between primary sodium and diathermic oil makes it possible to 
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avoid also an intermediate loop to uncouple the primary sodium and the heat transfer fluid. 
The use of diathermic oil instead of secondary sodium makes a loop leakage, outside the 
containment building, not hazardous since the oil does not react with air as sodium. In any 
case, depending on the oil operating temperature, some issues related to the auto-ignition 
of the oil has to be considered. 
Concerning the candle concept, considerations similar to that of the radiation-based DHX 
can be done. 
The examples here described are clearly related to innovative designs that are, at the 
present, under development. The increasing in the safety features will be a key parameter 
for selecting one specific design instead of another one. Considering the possible 
consequences related to an accidental event, especially after the Fukushima accident, 
including the releasing of radioactive materials, the strategic policy related to a specific 
remote area (e.g. mineral ore, oil field, military base, etc.) can make an inherently safe 
nuclear reactor more interesting than a cheaper standard nuclear reactor (it is possible 
that a nuclear reactor with a standard design could reach higher performance). 
Future nuclear reactors, for which a minimization of the environmental impact should be 
guaranteed also in an accidental event occurrence, will be mainly based on safety systems 
characterized by passive activation and operation features as well as an inherently safe 
systems (according to IAEA: higher the passive category of the system is and safer the 
plant will result). Probably, for some specific applications, the safety performance should 
be the reference parameter to select a specific design. At the present time, several 
designs are characterized by enhanced safety features, especially those designs focused 
on SMRs (e.g. NuScale, mPower, etc.). In any case, also large-size nuclear reactors can 
adopt passive safety systems to comply with the needed safety requirements (i.e. 
Westinghouse AP1000) while other designs are mainly based on diversification and 
physical separation criteria (i.e. Areva EPR). According to my personal opinion, once 
analyzed and deeply studied several proposed solutions, I am strongly convinced of the 
importance and of the unequaled characteristics that suitable passive safety systems can 
guarantee (these must be based on operation principles that exclude events able to 
negatively affect their performance). Specific design solutions that would increase the 
grace time and would make the reactor a walk away system will make it possible in the 
future to perceive safer the nuclear power utilization. 
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During the research work some problems affected the activities and the most important 
problems founded can be summarized by the following statements: 
 Needs to simplify the system model, focusing the main system pros and cons, in 
order to understand if the system has features to be developed or to be discarded; 
 Systems developed that are applicable to special context often face with the lack of 
experimental correlations to represent the selected phenomenon (e.g. heat transfer 
coefficient), in these cases a simplification to correctly model the phenomena has 
been required; 
 Innovative features of the systems make them often un-comparable with existing 
designs, preventing any possibility to further develop the system, on the basis of 
open issues already identified, before experimental test campaigns; 
 Concerning some existing designs, comparable with those developed, only very 
limited information are available (also limited to special features of the system 
itself). 
The systems here described are the final results of the evolution and the optimization 
processes applied to some solutions identified at the beginning. The effort done has been 
the result of many brainstorming among designers, researchers and specialists on specific 
issues. Further studies, especially finalized to some experimental tests as well as to some 
more specific performance definition, could be desirable. 
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8 ACRONYMS 
 
AHX Air cooled Heat eXchanger 
ATSS Additional Temperature-actuated Shutdown System 
CDF Core Damage Frequency 
CPP Containment for Primary loop Protection 
DHRS Decay Heat Removal System 
DHX Decay Heat eXchanger 
DRC  Direct Reactor Cooling system 
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System 
FR Fast Reactor 
GIF Generation IV International Forum 
IHX Intermediate Heat eXchanger 
ISC Intermediate Safety Circuit 
ISI&R In-Service Inspection & Repair 
LFR Lead Fast Reactor 
LMTD Log Mean Temperature Difference 
LOOP Loss of Offsite and of Onsite Power 
LWR Light Water Reactor 
MARS Multipurpose Advanced Reactor inherently Safe 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System 
PHX Pool water/air cooled Heat eXchanger 
PSA Probabilistic Risk Assessment  
PSC Primary Safety Circuit 
Acronyms 
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PWR Pressurized Water Reactor 
RHRS Residual Heat Removal System 
SCCS Safety Core Cooling System 
SFR Sodium Fast Reactor 
SG Steam Generator 
SMR Small and Medium Reactor 
STP Standard Temperature and Pressure 
SWR Sodium Water Reaction 
TSC Tertiary Safety Circuit 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization 
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